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This dissertation explores the relationship between morality and mental illness. Mental 
illness is often thought to impair moral functioning but careful examination reveals that 
mental illness offers its own insight into moral functioning. While we learn a great deal 
about moral responsibility and exempting conditions (psychopathy and addiction), we 
also discover that there a multiple ways to be moral and that many individuals act 
morally despite ongoing conditions (high-functioning autism spectrum disorder and 
recovered borderline personality disorder). I conclude that these insights ought to shape 
our ethical theories. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction – Dimensions of Moral Pathology 
 
“But imagine this though. Imagine having a mood system that functions essentially like weather 
– independently of whatever’s going on in your life. So the facts of your life remain the same, just 
the emotional fiction that you’re responding to differs. It’s like I’m not properly insulated – so 
all the bad and the good ways that you and most of the people in adjacent neighborhoods and 
around the world feel – that pours directly into my system unchecked. It’s so fun. I call it ‘getting 
on my grid’ or ESP: Egregious Sensory Protection. But ultimately I feel I’m very sane about how 
crazy I am.”  
 
Carrie Fisher (2008, p. 113-114) 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Carrie Fisher described her experience with bipolar disorder like being visited by a 
disjointed, almost whimsical intruder that disrupted her sense of narrative unity and subjected her 
to an onslaught on intense, impersonal emotions. Sasha Chapin (2016) experienced the same 
condition as central to his identity and mourned its loss when he began taking medication: “while 
there are lots of hard, simple words that encase identity…psychiatric diagnoses feel more 
fundamental…not being that [bipolar] anymore has flattened the extremities of my life. The 
biggest sensations of my life are over.” While individuals and clinicians alike may disagree 
about whether or not mental illness should define one’s identity, evidence clearly indicates that 
most conditions profoundly influence one’s behavior. Fisher (2008) attributed the dissolution of 
her first marriage and several subsequent relationships as well as multiple stays in drug 
rehabilitation facilities to not having a proper diagnosis or treatment plan. Chapin (2016) admits 
that he almost ended his life, had periods where he ate little to no food, and was an inattentive 
partner prior to taking medication to manage his bipolar disorder. 
I am interested in how mental illness affects behavior – specifically, moral behavior. The 
study of mental illness and morality has been mostly neglected by the philosophical literature 
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with psychopathy being a notable exception. Approximately 26-33% of adults worldwide will 
meet criteria for one or more mental illnesses at some point in their lives (Steel et al., 2014). The 
frequency of mental illness alone makes the study of morality and mental illness worthwhile, but 
this endeavor will also produce insights about human moral functioning more broadly.  
To mine these insights we must dive into the technical and empirical components of 
diagnosis and treatment of mental illness. Each chapter of this dissertation focuses on a different 
condition, analyzes its symptoms, treatment, and psychological data in order to cultivate moral 
insights. To understand the relevance of this process we must first understand the symptoms of 
mental illness as a dimension of typical functioning rather than a distinct category. 
1.2 Dimensional versus Categorical 
 
When writing the Fifth Edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-5) the American Psychiatric Association (APA) assembled a number of 
committees to discuss potential revisions. One of the topics under consideration was structural in 
the sense that it did not involve any disorder in particular but the formulation of the manual 
itself. Early editions of the DSM treated mental illnesses as categorical: an individual is 
depressed or she is not, an individual has schizophrenia or he does not. There was no room for 
gradations of severity or gray areas. Over time it became clear that many conditions would need 
additional specifications. In 1994, Asperger’s syndrome was introduced in the DSM-IV to 
distinguish between individuals with significant language, cognitive, and social impairments and 
those with high-functioning autism, for example (Ozonoff, South, & Miller, 2000).  
 By the time the DSM-5 was in the early production stages, some disorders were already 
calling themselves spectrums, including autism spectrum disorder and the schizophrenic 
spectrum. The ideology behind a spectrum disorder was that there were not discrete conditions of 
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varying severities or symptoms but rather one disorder with unifying symptoms on a sliding but 
continuous scale of severity that could be measured by degree. There is no diagnostic precision 
in labeling one child autistic and another pervasively developmentally delayed based on a couple 
of IQ points when both clearly need similar services. While most disorders are not formally 
spectrum conditions, the introduction to the DSM-5 encourages clinicians to use dimensional 
approaches during diagnosis (APA, 2013). Under this approach, an individual who is recovering 
from depression may not have the required number of symptoms for diagnosis (categorical 
approach) but the dimensional approach allows the clinician to see that she still needs support as 
she works through the subclinical symptoms. 
Extending the approach even further we can begin to understand the relationship between 
mental illness and typical functioning. Returning to the example of depression, an individual 
recovering from depression – let’s call her Sofia – may still suffer from subclinical symptoms 
(e.g. has trouble sleeping once or twice a week rather than everyday, feeling down but not 
depressed most days, etc.) even if she does not meet full criteria for the disorder. It seems 
inaccurate to say Sofia still suffers from depression yet equally ill-fitting to claim that she 
belongs in the same category as someone who experiences no subclinical symptoms. To properly 
classify Sofia’s experience (and others like her) it is best to understand depression as a 
dimensional scale ranging from common experiences of intermittent sadness and trouble 
sleeping, grief, etc. and severe symptoms of feeling depressed all day everyday, chronic 
insomnia, suicidal thoughts and actions, and other symptoms. The diagram below illustrates this 
idea and indicates where we might place Sofia along the dimensional continuum. 
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Figure 1: Dimensions of Major Depression 
Note that along the continuum Sofia is much closer “No Depression Symptoms” than “Full 
Depression Symptoms.” She also falls to the left of “DSM-5 Diagnosis of Major Depression” 
which means that she does not meet criteria for the disorder. The line is dotted because the exact 
point at which someone meets criteria for the disorder is vague and may vary slightly depending 
on who is diagnosing the condition. Moreover, the dimensional model is not designed to promote 
an abrupt cut-off point for diagnosis, allowing clinicians to use their judgment. 
 This continuum demonstrates that individuals with no depression symptoms are 
incrementally related to individuals who meet criteria for major depression and even individuals 
who experience full depression symptoms.1 While it is tempting to think of individuals with 
depression as wholly disparate from individuals without depression symptoms, the dimensional 
approach demonstrates that we are all related to individuals with major depression and many 
other mental illnesses. We all experience a depressed mood, difficulty sleeping, fatigue during 
times of stress, etc. from time to time. Similarly, we occasionally experience periods of intense 
worry, irritability, and restlessness but most people do not meet criteria for generalized anxiety 
disorder (APA, 2013). More generally, very few of us are perfect emotion regulators or 
                                                
1 Experiencing “Full Depression Symptoms” is logically possible but highly unlikely, especially since major 
depression includes contradictory symptoms such as “hypersomnia” and “insomnia.” 
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especially good at navigating interpersonal relationships. All of these qualities bring us closer to 
a variety of mental illnesses, particularly conditions that affect moral functioning. 
1.3  Moral Functioning and Mental Illness 
 
Again, it is important to emphasize that it is not merely meeting criteria for mental illness 
that affects moral functioning. Individuals with borderline personality disorder (BPD), for 
instance, experience an extreme fear of abandonment (APA, 2013). This fear can motivate 
immoral behavior, such as a partner interfering with their spouse’s promotion at work because 
they fear that the advancement will lead to infidelity. Individuals without BPD may also 
experience a fear of abandonment, either pathologically or on non-pathologically. Take Ji-hu, for 
example, who has been searching work for the past six months to no avail. He has been dating 
his partner for a year and is worried his lack of employment will cause his partner to leave. His 
partner reassures Ji-hu that they are still very much in love and that Ji-hu’s unemployment does 
not bother him. Nonetheless, Ji-hu worries his partner will leave him for someone more 
successful. Ji-hu’s fear of abandonment does not seem pathological but it is clear that he has 
some fear of abandonment. We might also think of individual symptoms dimensionally: 
Figure 2: Dimensions of the Symptom “Fear of Abandonment” 
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 This continuum differs slightly from the diagram used to describe the relationship 
between mental illness and no mental illness. The logical end points serve as mere bookends 
rather than anything practically useful. The BPD symptom lies just past the threshold for 
“pathological fear of abandonment” while Ji-hu lies well below. You can imagine someone with 
even less fear of abandonment than Ji-hu lying somewhere between Ji-hu and “no fear of 
abandonment.” While Ji-hu’s fear of abandonment causes very little interference with his moral 
functioning (e.g. perhaps his worry pulls away his attention from some morally relevant 
responsibilities), the fear of abandonment experienced by those with BPD can be very 
detrimental. The dimensional model demonstrates that this symptom is not all or none and that 
most of us, like Ji-hu, experience some fear of abandonment that can impede our moral 
functioning to some degree. 
As I mentioned in the introduction, mental illness affects approximately one-third of the 
population at some point in their lives. If this is not compelling enough, then the dimensional ties 
to the other two-thirds of moral agents should be convincing. By carefully studying mental 
illness – symptoms, treatments, case studies, effects on emotional, social, and cognitive function 
– and morality – moral responsibility, normative theories of praise and virtue, agency – we can 
discover new ways in which our psychological functioning impacts moral functioning. In this 
dissertation I explore four conditions in depth: psychopathy, addiction, borderline personality 
disorder, and autism spectrum disorders. In the following section I will briefly describe the plan 
for each chapter. 
1.4 Four Conditions 
I chose to focus on these four conditions because they overtly impact moral functioning. 
While the symptoms of borderline personality disorder have devastating consequences for 
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emotional, social, and intrapersonal functioning that cause clear moral harms (more on this 
below), the symptoms of disorders like bipolar disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, and 
post-traumatic stress disorder (while harrowing for the individual and their loved ones) influence 
moral functioning much more subtly. Carrie Fisher attributes the dissolution of her first marriage 
to her bipolar disorder but the causal relationship is unclear. Was it the days of depression where 
she could not get out of bed and fulfill the promises she made to her partner? Or was it the manic 
episodes where she was excessively irritable and treated her partner poorly? We could speculate 
why she blamed herself but with a condition like bipolar the moral consequences are much 
harder to connect back to the symptoms of the disorder. 
On the other hand, we might think of someone who meets criteria for BPD and also sees 
his marriage come to an end. It is clear that Michael is morally responsible for the end of his 
marriage because of his tendency to lash out violently at his partner, often causing serious 
physical harm. Not all cases of BPD will be this clear-cut but as the chapter demonstrates, BPD 
is a disorder with symptoms that directly impact moral functioning. Again, I do think most 
mental illnesses impact moral functioning but it makes sense to focus on the clearest cases.  
1.4.1 Psychopathy 
There is perhaps no clearer case of mental illness affecting moral functioning than the 
case of the psychopath. Psychopathy is not an official DSM diagnosis; rather, it is a classification 
developed by Robert Hare and colleagues (1990) to describe a subset of individuals with 
antisocial personality disorder. I describe the condition in depth in the chapter but briefly: 
psychopaths are impulsive, callous, and often criminal. They appear to act without any regard to 
moral rules and are often described as “amoral”. Some philosophers have argued that 
psychopaths suffer from a rational deficit: Maibom (2005) claims that psychopaths struggle with 
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practical reasoning which includes tasks like making plans, assessing one’s own abilities, and 
moral reasoning. Others like Caouette (2013) argue that psychopaths are motivationally 
deficient: they are less motivated than non-psychopaths to act morally. While some psychopaths 
may suffer from deficits in practical reasoning (and other cognitive functioning) as well as 
motivation, I argue that these deficits do not get at the heart of the moral deficit characteristic of 
the disorder: psychopaths are incapable of compassion. 
The idea that psychopaths do not feel compassion is supported by empirical literature and 
helps explain the kind of immoral behavior we see from this population. A psychopath without 
significant intellectual deficits may keep up appearances, following some of society’s moral 
rules for the sake of their own convenience. John Grambling Jr., a successful businessman to all 
his peers and clients, tricked his sister into signing a $4.5 million mortgage, took the money, and 
left her in debt. At home he was tyrannical and his wife feared for the family’s safety (Rosner, 
1990). Grambling felt nothing for his sister, his wife, or his children but was motivated to behave 
collegially at work to promote his business career. 
I conclude that psychopaths exhibit the importance of compassion in moral functioning 
by virtue of its absence. Compassion is not merely an emotion; it is our capacity to detect 
morally-relevant cues in the environment. Compassion allows us to see a financial arrangement 
with our sister as more than an opportunity to make money. With compassion we understand the 
potential suffering we can cause by ripping someone off or engaging in deceptive practices. 
Compassion does not guarantee that we will choose the morally right action, but it allows us to 
flag the situation as moral and distinct from non-moral situations.  
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  1.4.2 Addiction 
The chapter on addiction takes a different approach than psychopathy. Over the past 
century addiction has gone from a highly moralized disorder (i.e. something like a weakness of 
will for which the agent should be blamed) to being understood as a clinical disease (i.e. 
addiction is something that happens to you, no blame). When talking to addicts, however, I 
found that many want to be held responsible for their condition. Addiction can lead to any 
number of immoral actions, from those done in pursuit of additional substances (e.g. stealing 
money from family members) to those done under the influence of substances (e.g. driving while 
drunk). Unlike psychopaths, individuals with addiction can and often do feel genuine guilt for 
their actions. Moreover, they are often motivated to recover from addiction and act morally.2 
The DSM-5 divides addiction into separate disorders based on substance. In my chapter I 
generalize across substances – from nicotine to narcotics – and focus on five general components 
listed in the DSM: impaired control, social impairment, risky use, tolerance, and withdrawal 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). I argue that many cases of addiction are caused by 
deficits in emotion regulation and that these deficits exempt individuals who suffer from 
addiction from moral responsibility. We use emotion regulation to deal with challenging life 
circumstances which may include difficult coworkers, the death of a loved one, breakups, or bad 
traffic. Emotion regulation allows us to respond to these situations with the appropriate amount 
of emotion: we grieve our loved ones rather than shutting down, we engage with the painful 
emotions of a breakup rather than simply getting angry, and so on. Substances provide an 
alternative to dealing with our emotions appropriately. Utilizing empirical data, I argue that 
                                                
2 Compared to psychopathy which is not curable. Psychopaths do not usually want to be cured or overcome their 
morally relevant deficits. 
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many individuals suffering from addiction cope with difficult situations and emotions through 
substances rather than effective emotion regulation strategies. 
Individuals with addiction who learn emotion regulation strategies in treatment programs 
experience better outcomes than individuals who do not learn emotion regulation strategies 
(Hopwood et al., 2015; Tull et al., 2102; Axelrod et al., 2011). Addiction demonstrates that 
emotion regulation is a capacity necessary for moral functioning. I expand upon Vargas’s (2013) 
view of moral responsibility and argue that emotion regulation is another psychological capacity 
needed for full moral functioning.  
 1.4.3  Borderline Personality Disorder 
The discussion of “fear of abandonment” demonstrated one way that the symptoms of 
BPD can influence moral functioning. BPD is a chronic mental illness affecting social, 
emotional, and cognitive functioning as well as the stability of one’s identity (APA, 2013). BPD 
can make it difficult to keep a steady job, maintain relationships, and sometimes leads to 
criminal behavior. While I argue that individuals who meet criteria for BPD are not morally 
responsible for their actions, the bulk of my discussion is devoted the unique characteristics of 
individuals in recovery from BPD. I argue that these individuals are morally responsible for their 
actions and pose a unique challenge for virtue ethics. 
Recovery from BPD is a continual, arduous journey that requires adept emotion 
regulation to manage mood swings and heightened anger, carefully practiced interpersonal skills 
to combat relational turmoil, and more. Because of the extra effort required to manage their 
symptoms, the individual in recovery from BPD does more than the typical moral agent to 
perform the same moral actions. These extra efforts, however, mean that individuals in recovery 
from BPD are not capable of achieving virtue according to most virtue theories. Virtuous activity 
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is supposed to come with little or no difficultly to the virtuous agent. Individuals in recovery 
from BPD, unlike virtuous agents, often find virtuous activity extremely difficult. 
I argue that despite the traditional methodologies, individuals in recovery from BPD are 
virtuous and that our virtue theories should be revised to accommodate diverse moral 
psychologies. Unlike the previous chapters, the BPD chapter does not illuminate a deficiency in 
moral functioning to illustrate the importance of any one psychological capacity; rather, it shows 
how mental illness can expend our understanding of what it means to be morally excellent. 
 1.4.4 Autism Spectrum Disorders 
Symptoms of autism spectrum disorders (ASD) affect social, sensory, and cognitive 
functioning. The severity of symptoms varies widely: some individuals live independently and 
pursue competitive careers while others require lifelong assistance. These symptoms may make 
moral functioning more challenging but unlike psychopathy, addiction, and BPD, ASD does not 
seem to impact moral functioning in any unique way. Individuals with severe cognitive deficits 
may be exempt from moral responsibility but this is not unique to ASD. Conditions like 
intellectual disability, Alzheimer’s disease, traumatic brain injury, and even some presentations 
of psychopathy also feature severe cognitive impairments (APA, 2013) that intuitively mitigate 
or exempt the individual from moral responsibility. 
Instead I focus on individuals without severe cognitive impairments. These individuals 
are considered high-functioning (HFASD). I argue that individuals with HFASD should be held 
morally responsible for their actions. My view focuses on the capabilities of individuals with 
ASD rather than any moral deficits. Unlike psychopaths, individuals with HFASD are capable of 
empathy though they may encounter challenges expressing it. They experience deficits in social 
functioning that may make it harder to come up with the right words of comfort in a difficult 
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situation. I argue that these challenges to implement empathic actions but do not affect moral 
responsibility. As I have argued elsewhere, empathy motivates moral actions when we recognize 
the suffering of another and feel a desire to help (see Cameron and Rapier, 2017). Individuals 
with HFASD can recognize the suffering of another, feel a desire to help, and act morally. The 
symptoms of HFASD may make it more difficult to discern which actions to implement. I argue 
that these differences in moral functioning do not prevent an individual with HFASD from acting 
morally in most cases. 
Unlike cases of emotional fatigue or compassion collapse, symptoms of HFASD do not 
cause the individual to ignore the suffering of another or fail to implement a moral action. The 
social deficits in HFASD can prevent the individual from having epistemic access to information 
about the morally appropriate action. I suggest that these cases are rare and that in most instances 
individuals with HFASD can detect suffering and implement moral action. We should treat these 
failures of epistemic access the same as encountering novel, difficult moral situations. For 
example: you perceive that a colleague is suffering from financial problems because he no longer 
attends office lunches or contributes to group gifts. You understand that he is in distress and are 
motivated to help. You do not know him well enough to ask about his troubles nor is it socially 
appropriate to collect money on his behalf. It is unclear what action morality requires and doing 
nothing does not seem necessarily blameworthy. Similarly, an individual with HFASD realizes a 
friend is suffering after the loss of a loved one. The individual with HFASD feels sorrow for her 
friend but has never lost a loved one herself. She feels for her friend, is motivated to help, but 
does not know what to do. Again, it seems that the individual with HFASD is not morally 
blameworthy for not knowing what to do.  
 
 
13 
While psychopaths are incapable of feeling for another, individuals with HFASD feel 
empathy but experience social and communication deficits that can make moral action more 
challenging. These challenges are not distinct from the difficulties we all face when navigating 
the moral landscape. We all, at times, fail to identify the proper moral action due to barriers in 
epistemic access. Imperfect knowledge does not lessen our moral responsibility. 
1.5  Conclusion 
This dissertation features four mental illnesses – psychopathy, addiction, borderline 
personality disorder, and autism spectrum disorder – and their relationship with moral 
functioning. The philosophical assertions are supported by empirical findings as well as the 
words of individuals who experience the conditions. These words are especially important in 
capturing the experience of living with mental illness. While I take this project to be an academic 
endeavor it is also a personal one for approximately 2 billion people worldwide who either have 
or will experience mental illness and countless others who’s lives have been changed by the 
diagnosis of a loved one. That is why I have taken care to research each condition thoroughly, 
providing a fair and rigorous analysis. I have also spent clinical hours with individuals with 
substance use disorder and autism spectrum disorders. I have consulted at length with clinicians 
who treat borderline personality disorder and spent time unstructured time with individuals with 
this condition. Unfortunately I was not able to meet with psychopaths or clinicians in this area 
but I included more case studies in my background reading for this condition to compensate. 
This is not to say that there will not be complaints, concerns, and mistakes, only to show that I 
made a good faith effort.  
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Chapter 2:  
“How did you feel the last time you squashed a bug?”3: 
Compassion, Moral Responsibility, and the  
High-Functioning Psychopath 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Robert Hare – a clinical psychologist who worked with criminal populations – once 
interviewed a man serving time for kidnapping, rape, and extortion. Discussing his crimes, the 
man said:  
Do I care about other people? That’s a tough one. But, yeah, I guess I really  
do…but I don’t let my feelings get in the way…You’ve got to look out for  
yourself, park your feelings…Do I feel bad if I have to hurt someone? Yeah,  
sometimes. But mostly it’s like… uh… [laughs]… how did you feel the last  
time you squashed a bug? (Hare, 1999, p. 33).3 
 
Hare’s clinical evaluation ultimately determined that this man was a psychopath. 
Psychopaths are individuals, like the man quoted above, who meet clinical criteria for 
psychopathy – they may act impulsively, callously, and criminally. When people think of 
psychopaths, one (or both) of the following profiles comes to mind: a high-ranking business 
professional who functions well in society but who’s successful career was built upon cutthroat 
tactics and cold-hearted decision-making, or an inscrutable career criminal, who’s in and out of 
prison for most of his adult life for offenses ranging from murder and assault to petty larceny and 
check fraud. 
These disparate profiles demonstrate why I divide psychopathy and other mental 
disorders into two categories: high-functioning and low-functioning psychopaths. Individuals 
with high-functioning presentations of mental disorders often “pass” as typically functioning 
                                                
3 Quote from Hare (1990, p. 33) from a psychopath in prison for rape, kidnapping, and extortion. 
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adults – they hold steady jobs, maintain long-term relationships, and demonstrate competence in 
basic social interactions. The high-functioning psychopath, the CEO archetype, possesses callous 
and unemotional traits but does not experience other cognitive deficits. The high-functioning 
psychopath performs well in society – he is capable of caring for himself, holding a steady job, 
and pursuing serious romantic relationships.  
Low-functioning presentations of mental disorders are characterized by mild to severe 
cognitive deficits, including low IQ scores, poor impulse control, and difficulties performing 
daily tasks. The low-functioning psychopath, the career criminal, may or may not possess callous 
and unemotional traits but does experience cognitive deficits, particularly in areas of executive 
functioning (e.g. planning, impulse control). The low-functioning psychopath may have 
difficulties adapting to adult responsibilities (e.g., paying rent, treating chronic health problems, 
obeying laws), jump from job to job (consistent with his prison record), and often experiences 
tumultuous temporary romantic relationships or marriages. 
On many accounts, the low-functioning psychopath and individuals with low-functioning 
presentations of other mental disorders escape moral responsibility in the same way an individual 
with moderate intellectual disability (IQ < 52) might be exempt (Shoemaker, 2010).4 For the 
purposes of this dissertation, I will ignore the arguments concerning exemption for individuals 
with low-functioning presentations of mental disorders. I am more interested in cases where we 
are not convinced that an individual with a mental disorder meets cognitive deficiency criteria 
for exemption from moral responsibility or legal insanity – the individual with high-functioning 
autism spectrum disorder, borderline personality disorder, substance abuse disorder, and, for the 
purposes of this essay, the high-functioning psychopath. These individuals are often highly 
                                                
4 Shoemaker (2010) argues that individuals with mild intellectual disability (IQ 52-69) are usually considered 
members of the moral community (p. 202). 
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successful, holding prestigious positions at universities or running business featured on the 
Forbes Global 2000. By nearly all definitions these individuals are competent to stand trial and 
face the legal consequences of their actions. But are they morally competent? More specifically, 
are high-functioning psychopaths morally responsible for their actions?  
Many philosophers argue that it is the rational deficits present only in individuals that I 
have designated low-functioning psychopaths that mediate moral responsibility (Kennett, 2010). 
Caouette (2013), for example, argues that while it might be motivationally difficult for 
psychopaths to act morally, there is no evidence that they cannot act morally. High-functioning 
psychopaths in particular should be able to overcome this rational deficit and learn to act 
morally. 
Despite their intellectual competence, I argue that high-functioning psychopaths should 
not be held morally responsible for their actions. High-functioning psychopaths are emotionally 
deficient. Specifically, high-functioning psychopaths are unable to pick up on compassion-
relevant cues in the environment through emotional pathways. This deficit, on my view, prevents 
the psychopath from feeling the force of moral salience.  
I begin by discussing the clinical criteria for psychopathy through empirical literature, 
highlighting the importance of deficits in compassion. Then I distinguish between high-
functioning and low-functioning psychopaths. Next I discuss how compassion and 
responsiveness to punishment develop in typically developing human beings versus psychopaths. 
I then describe moral agency and moral responsibility, using Vargas’s (2013) reasons-
responsiveness account. I consider several consequences of this view and answer potential 
objections in Section 4 and conclude with Section 5. 
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2.2 Delineating Psychopathy 
2.2.1 Emotional Insight versus Compassion 
Psychological research suggests that psychopaths are fully capable of emotional insight – 
understanding the emotions of another (also known as cognitive empathy, mindreading, etc.). 
The same studies also conclude that psychopaths suffer from severe deficits in picking up on 
compassion-relevant emotional cues about the needs and interests of others. I use the term 
“compassion” to refer to an emotion and behavior (Cameron & Rapier, 2017). Specifically: “the 
feeling that arises in witnessing another’s suffering that motivates a subsequent desire to help” 
(Goetz et al., 2010, p. 351). Though the term “compassion” has recently been obscured by folk 
psychological intuitions and philosophical stipulations, I use “compassion” to refer to the ability 
to pick up compassion-relevant emotional cues in the environment and feel concern. For 
example, when I see a colleague at my office (environment) expressing distress (compassion-
relevant emotional cue) over research deadlines, I identify his suffering (emotional insight), but 
also feel a sense of emotional concern for his plight. I feel compassion. 
Psychopaths also demonstrate deficits in anxiety and fear processing (see below; also 
Dolan & Rennie, 2007). Some psychopaths exhibit difficulties in managing anger (Blackburn, 
1988). Though this is much more readily apparent in low-functioning psychopaths whose angry 
outbursts often result in violent criminal behavior (e.g., Kiehl, 2014), high-functioning 
psychopaths can struggle with anger as well, as demonstrated by individuals like John 
Grambling, Jr. discussed in section 2.3 whose anger took a toll on his close personal 
relationships.  
In the following subsection I discuss the empirical data in detail. Authors like Maiese 
(2014) argue that the “emotional” deficits in psychopathy are interdependent with cognitive 
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deficits; she denies the claim that we can meaningfully distinguish between cognitive and 
emotional processes like emotional insight and compassion sensitivity. I present empirical 
evidence that contradicts this claim. 
2.2.2 Clinical Criteria for Psychopathy 
Psychopathy is primarily diagnosed through Robert Hare’s Revised Psychopathy 
Checklist (1990; see Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpartrick 1995, Morgan & Lilienfield, 2000, and 
Blair, 1995). The Checklist is a semi-structured interview completed by a trained clinical 
psychologist, typically in an institutional setting. It includes items measuring traits and behaviors 
ranging from “criminal versatility” to “shallow affect” (Hare et al., 1990, p. 339). At first glance, 
the checklist seems to encompass a variety of symptomatic presentations. For example, someone 
may score highly on items like “need for stimulation” and “impulsivity” but fail to demonstrate 
symptoms like “pathological lying” and “conning/manipulating.” After conducting a two-factor 
analysis of the items, Hare and colleagues found that 10 items correlated with the factor 
associated with “need for stimulation” and impulsivity” (p. 339). They found that 8 other items 
correlated with the factor associated with “pathological lying” and “conning/manipulating.”5 For 
a discussion of moral agency and salience, I am interested in individuals who score highly on the 
8-item-factor. I’ll call this the interpersonal-affective factor.6 
The interpersonal-affective Factor includes 8 items assessing the following traits and 
behaviors: “glibness/superficial charm,” “grandiose sense of self-worth,” “pathological lying,” 
“conning/manipulative,” “lack of remorse or guilt,” “shallow affect,” “callous/lack of empathy,” 
and “failure to accept responsibility” (p. 339). The total score for these eight items ranges from 0 
                                                
5 Astute mathematicians may have noticed that these two factors combined only account for 18 of the 20 items on 
Hare’s Checklist. The other two items, “promiscuous sexual behavior,” and “criminal versatility,” did not correlate 
with either factor group. 
6 In another essay, Hare and Neumann (2010) refer to four of the items as “interpersonal’ and the other four as 
“affective,” thus the name I give the combined factor. 
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to 16. Using the same proportions as Hare and colleagues used to determine the cut-off score for 
the entire Checklist, a score of approximately 12 would be clinically significant.7 Hare and 
colleagues identify this subset of psychopaths but do not name them. I will call individuals who 
satisfy this criterion Callous-Unemotional Psychopaths. 
Schwenck and colleagues (2012) differentiated between two factors in Hare’s (1990) 
Psychopathy Checklist, Factor 1 (affective/interpersonal deficits) and Factor 2 (executive 
functioning) (p. 339), to measure psychopathic traits in children with conduct disorder. Conduct 
disorder is diagnosed in childhood and can be understood as the developmental prerequisite for 
psychopathy.8 Conduct disorder is characterized by aggressive, violent, and dishonest behaviors, 
such as breaking into a building or physical/psychological cruelty towards persons or non-human 
animals (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The disorder also has a “with limited 
prosocial emotions” specification, including “lack of remorse or guilt,” “callous-lack of 
empathy,” and “shallow or deficient affect” (American Psychiatric Association, “Conduct 
Disorder”, 2013). Conduct disorder is a requirement for an adult diagnosis of antisocial 
personality disorder, though not all children with conduct disorder will meet criteria for 
antisocial personality disorder as adults. Note that not all individuals with antisocial personality 
disorders are psychopaths, but all psychopaths meet criteria for antisocial personality disorder 
(Hare, 1999). To address this confusion, the authors differentiate between conduct disorder with 
callous-unemotional traits and conduct disorder without callous-unemotional traits. Children in 
                                                
7 A score of 30 is 75% of the maximum score of 40 on the full Revised Psychopathy Checklist. The maximum score 
for the Interpersonal-Affective Factor is 16; 75% of 16 is 12.  
8 Note that all personality disorders require that the individual be eighteen or older. In other words, psychologists 
cannot diagnose a child with antisocial personality disorder even if they display psychopathic traits. This is where 
conduct disorder comes in. 
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the latter category are less likely to become psychopaths as adults.9 The authors evaluated 
callous-unemotional traits using the Inventory of Callous-Unemotional Traits (Kimonis et al. 
2008). 
The Inventory of Callous-Unemotional Traits closely resembles Hare’s Factor 1 – the 
interpersonal-affective factor. Recall that Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist is designed for clinicians 
to assess primarily incarcerated or hospitalized adults. Frick developed the Inventory of Callous-
Unemotional Traits using the youth version of the Psychopathy Checklist and made 
modifications to measure psychopathic traits in children outside of the clinic. The Inventory 
evaluates participants along three traits/behaviors: uncaring (“I do things to make others feel 
good,” reverse-scored), callousness (“The feelings of others are unimportant to me”), and 
unemotional (“I do not show my emotions to others”) (Kimonis et al., 2008, p. 248). These traits 
align with four of the eight Interpersonal-Affective items on the Psychopathy Checklist, with 
uncaring tapping into “lack of remorse or guilt” and “grandiose sense of self-worth,” callousness 
tapping into “callous/lack of empathy,” and unemotional tapping into “shallow affect.”10 
Schwenck and colleagues (2012) used the parental report version of the Inventory. 
Parents rated the items from 0 to 3, with 0 indicating that the trait/behavior does not describe 
their child. Total scores range from 0 to 72. The authors used the median score of the entire 
conduct disorder group (p. 32) and above to differentiate between individuals with and without 
callous-unemotional traits, and reported that this was similar to the cutoff used in previous 
studies (p. 652-653). Using this distinction and a comprehensive assessment for autism spectrum 
disorders, the authors assessed cognitive and affective empathy in children with high-functioning 
                                                
9 A child who presents with the full spectrum of psychopathic traits is more likely to become an irrational 
psychopath, based on additional cognitive deficits outside the Inventory of Callous-Unemotional Traits. 
10 Hinshaw and Zupan (1997) claim that symptoms of psychopathy vary throughout the lifespan. Given this insight 
and the developmental research presented in other sections, it makes sense that the Inventory of Callous-
Unemotional Traits would not measure all of the factors assessed in the adult Psychopathy Checklist. 
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autism spectrum disorder, conduct disorder with and without callous-unemotional traits, and a 
control group.  
The authors found no significant differences in emotional insight in the control group and 
both conduct disorder groups. The control group and both conduct disorder groups were able to 
correctly identify cognitively complex behaviors in the animated-shapes-task and were able to 
quickly recognize the emotional expression in the morphing faces task. Consistent with previous 
studies, individuals with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder performed more poorly than 
the control group and both conduct disorder groups on the animated-shapes-task (they identified 
the cognitive complex tasks less accurately) and the morphing faces task (they took longer to 
recognize expressions of sadness) (Schwenck et al., 2012, p. 655).  
In the compassion sensitivity tasks, individuals with high-functioning autism spectrum 
disorder and conduct disorder without callous-unemotional traits performed comparably to 
control groups. Participants in the conduct disorder with callous-unemotional traits, however, 
were significantly less emotionally affected by the video clips than the high-functioning autism 
and control groups. (Schwenck et al, 2012, p. 656).  
In a similar study Jones, Happé, Gilbert, Burnett, and Viding (2010) found that boys 
(ages 9-16) with psychopathic traits demonstrated deficits in compassion sensitivity but not 
emotional insight, while boys with autism spectrum disorder demonstrated deficits in insight but 
not sensitivity. Jones and colleagues (2010) used an emotional attribution task to assess affective 
empathy. Boys with psychopathic traits (as measured by Frick’s Inventory of 
Callous/Unemotional Traits) responded less emotionally to written scenarios like “You made fun 
of a quiet girl you know and it made her cry. How guilty would you feel?” than boys with autism 
spectrum disorder (p. 1192).  
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Mullins-Nelson, Salekin, and Leistico (2006) also found a deficit in compassion 
sensitivity in individuals with high levels of psychopathic traits (as measured by the short form 
of Hare’s Checklist) from an undergraduate population. Individuals with high levels of 
psychopathic traits scored lower on the empathic concern subscale of the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (self-report measure of empathy) and the shame and guilt subscales of the Test 
of Self-Conscious Affect (a scenario response-based assessment, similar to Jones and colleagues’ 
(2010) methodology). As we will discuss in section 2.3, the developmental literature is essential 
to our understanding of compassion sensitivity in psychopathy. 
Psychopaths also demonstrate deficits in fear responsiveness (Hoppenbruwers, Van der 
Stigchel, Slotboom, Dalmaijer, & Theeuwes, 2015; Dolan & Rennie, 2007; Birbaumer et al., 
2005). Psychopaths do not respond to fearful stimuli in the same way as typically developing 
individuals. One hypothesis suggests this deficit is related to higher-order cognitive processes 
and attention. Psychopaths are not adequately sensitive to emotion-laden stimuli in their 
environment (Newman, Curtin, Bertsch, & Baskin-Sommers, 2010).  This deficit has been 
robustly demonstrated in low-functioning psychopaths but has yet to be substantially studied in 
high-functioning psychopaths. While this deficit will likely support arguments in favor of 
excusing rational psychopaths from moral responsibility, the current data is insufficient. 
2.2.3 CEOs and Serial Killers 
Dividing psychopaths into two groups is a thorny task subject to many debates. Maibom 
(2008) denies that there is any meaningful distinction between “successful” and “unsuccessful” 
psychopaths. I should first note that I partially agree with Maibom: psychopaths in vivo do not 
divide neatly into two discrete categories. Nonetheless, the distinction allows us to talk about 
psychopaths with or without intellectual impairments. There is a significant difference between 
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individuals who score highly on the Psychopathy Checklist and present with other cognitive 
deficits versus individuals who score highly and function normally in society. As I mentioned in 
the introduction, low-functioning psychopaths are typically exempt from moral responsibility 
due to significant cognitive deficits. The notion of a high-functioning psychopath allows us to 
discuss how psychopathy mediates moral responsibility independent of comorbid cognitive or 
intellectual deficits. 
High-functioning psychopaths are characteristically cunning, manipulative, and suave. 
One case of a high-functioning psychopath is John Grambling, Jr. Grambling and his associate 
stole $23.5 million total from several banks by appearing good-natured and trustworthy. 
Grambling’s social finesse allowed him to manipulate high-ranking bank officials to loan him 
money (Hare, p. 103). Not to confuse Grambling with some kind of Robin Hood – merely 
stealing from large corporations who (arguably) had the cash to spare and giving to the poor – he 
conned his family as well as corporations for personal gain. Grambling convinced his sister to 
sign a $4.5 million mortgage only to run off with the money and leave her in debt. At home, 
Grambling was a terrible father, unfeeling and unavailable, and his wife feared for the safety of 
their children. The attorney that prosecuted Grambling, Brian Rosner (1990), sums up 
Grambling’s character and the portrait of a greed-driven, high-functioning psychopath as 
follows: “the relentless drive to accumulate wealth; the use of people to obtain that end; the 
abandonment of all emotion and human attachment other than self-love” (p. 361). 
Ressler and Burgess (1985) identify other characteristics of what they call an “organized 
offender”: social and sexual competence, average to above-average IQ, relative relational 
stability (“living with partner”), stable mood while committing the offense, and may have 
recently experienced a stressful life event, among others (p. 19). These traits describe Grambling 
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and a high-functioning psychopath. High-functioning psychopaths may work their way up to 
positions of authority in law, business, medicine, politics, or academia (Hare, p. 107). Because of 
their success, high-functioning psychopaths are more difficult to identify. 
Unlike high-functioning psychopaths, low-functioning psychopaths are often caught and 
thereby identifiable through the justice system. Low-functioning psychopaths are commonly 
featured in the media through high-profile murder cases or horrific fictional portrayals. Low-
functioning psychopaths often end up in prison, readily available for psychological and 
criminological research.  
Now that we have a basic understanding of my use of “psychopath” in this essay and the 
difference between high-functioning and low-functioning psychopaths, I should clarify what I 
mean by compassion sensitivity. My discussion of compassion is grounded in the developmental 
literature. I cite psychological research that demonstrates that, unlike most other adults, 
psychopaths do not develop compassion sensitivity in childhood. 
2.2.4 Burgeoning Psychopathy: The Developmental Trajectory 
2.2.4.1     Compassion Sensitivity 
Compassion allows human beings to recognize morally-charged situations. Compassion 
sensitivity allows an individual to detect another’s suffering and inquire about the cause. Human 
beings are not born with perfectly tuned compassion sensitivity; rather, typically developing 
individuals refine their compassion sensitivity throughout the lifespan. 
According to Hoffman (2000), researchers observe signs of empathic distress in 
newborns. Most people are familiar with the image of a wailing nursery room at the maternity 
wing of a hospital: one infant starts crying, and before long all babies within hearing range chime 
in. This reaction, however, is simply emotional contagion. Emotional contagion is an automatic 
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response in which an observer imitates the emotions displayed by another (Coplan, 2011). 
Emotional contagion is distinct from compassion because emotional contagion does not involve 
genuine concern for the other. Children begin to show signs of burgeoning compassion 
sensitivity as early as ages two and three (Hoffman, 2000). Children will become distressed and 
demonstrate concern at the sight of a crying adult or peer, rather than merely mimicking the 
other’s display of sadness.  Though a young child’s expression of compassion is cognitively 
simplistic, it is crucial to the development of the capacity for sophisticated compassion 
sensitivity.  
Recall from the introduction: compassion sensitivity is the ability to recognize 
compassion-relevant emotional cues about the needs and interests of others. According to this 
definition, at least two capacities must be present in order to experience compassion: (1) the 
ability to distinguish between one’s own feelings and the feelings of another and (2) the ability to 
feel emotional concern for another. Infants and young children who have not moved past the 
emotional contagion stage of development struggle to disentangle their own feelings of distress 
from the feelings of the other. This affective quagmire makes it difficult to feel genuine concern 
for another, since the observer is often overwhelmed by her own feelings of distress. 
The first capacity is clearly detailed in the developmental literature. Hoffman (2000) 
claims that children begin to distinguish between self and the other around age two. Very young 
children (ages 2-4) recognize themselves in the mirror and begin to understand that others have 
feelings and other mental states that may or may not match their own. The second capacity is 
more complicated. As I discussed above, children begin to feel distress at the sight of another’s 
sadness around ages two and three. They feel uncomfortable when another child displays sadness 
and seek to escape from the situation. When does this distress evolve into emotional concern? In 
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other words, when does the child feel moved to remedy the cause of the other child’s sadness 
rather than escape? Consistent with the developmental literature, I claim that emotional concern 
comes in degrees (Hoffman, 2000; Zahn-Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1990; Eisenberg, McCreath, 
& Ahn, 1988). The development of emotional concern for another is gradual and individualized 
throughout the lifespan.  
Children develop emotional concern as they begin to understand emotional complexity. 
Prepubescent children (ages 8-11) understand that a child can be both happy and sad about the 
same situation: Jayden is happy that his mom picked him up early from school but sad to miss 
the birthday party held in the afternoon (Hoffman, 2000). They also understand how an 
individual’s past experience can affect her current emotional experience: if the child knows that 
his friend Hae was bitten by a dog in the past, the child understands that Hae will not be happy to 
meet a puppy and can feel emotional concern for Hae, even as the child himself is excited to see 
the puppy. In adolescence, children begin to recognize emotional deception: an adolescent can 
feel emotional concern for his father’s stress, even as the father pretends to be happy about 
leaving for work before sunrise (Hoffman, 2000).  
Variance in the capacity for emotional concern for others modulates the degrees of one’s 
compassion sensitivity and thus one’s degree of moral responsibility. A young child, for 
example, has a limited capacity for emotional concern, thus a limited capacity for compassion 
and a low degree of moral responsibility. An emotionally mature adult, on the other hand, has 
full capacity for emotional concern and sufficiently developed compassion sensitivity. In 
typically developing individuals, moral responsibility, emotional insight, and compassion 
sensitivity increase with age until early adulthood. Individuals with autism spectrum disorder, 
borderline personality disorder (and other personality disorders), and psychopathy grow up 
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differently than typically developing children. In psychopaths, emotional insight develops (if at 
all) independently of compassion. Without compassion sensitivity, psychopaths cannot be held 
responsible for their actions. In the following section I analyze psychological research on 
psychopaths and compassion sensitivity that demonstrates the validity of this exemption. 
2.2.4.2     Responsiveness to Punishment/Reward 
Research in developmental predecessors of psychopathy such as conduct disorder reveal 
a developmental trajectory that looks markedly different than typically developing children. A 
key component of developing antisocial behavior involves responsiveness to punishment. 
Parents and teachers scaffold a child’s development of emotional concern through punishment. If 
Joanna’s father observes her repeatedly smashing Izzy’s fingers in the Barbie elevator, he will 
scold Joanna and might punish her by putting her in a time out. The prospect of punishment 
serves as a further deterrent for antisocial action while children are developing compassion. 
Children with psychopathic traits, however, do not respond to punishment in this way, as 
demonstrated by the empirical literature.11  
Jones and colleagues (2010) used the Outcome Values Measure (Boldizar, Perry, & 
Perry, 1989; Pardini et al, 2003 as cited by Jones et al., 2010) to evaluate how boys with and 
without psychopathic traits valued various outcomes of aggression towards a male peer. One of 
the possible outcomes involved punishment. Participants were asked “how much they cared 
about…being punished for their aggressive response” (Jones et al., 2010, p. 1191). The authors 
found that boys with psychopathic traits were less concerned about being punished for 
aggression than boys without psychopathic traits (Jones et al., 2010, p. 1193). In other words, 
                                                
11 There are several theories that try to explain this difference (Pardini, Lochman, & Frick, 2003). One involves self-
regulation. Children with psychopathic traits might have a harder time adjusting their behavior to meet certain goals. 
Another explanation involves belief: children with psychopathic traits do not believe that their behavior causes 
punishment. A third explanation, and the explanation I find most compelling, claims that children with psychopathic 
traits do not value the consequences of punishment in the same way as typically developing children. 
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boys with psychopathic traits did not respond to the prospect of punishment in the same way as 
boys without psychopathic traits. Typically developing children will be concerned about the 
prospect of being punished for aggressive behavior, perhaps even to the point of being motivated 
to inhibit aggressive behavior. Boys with psychopathic traits, on the other hand, do not consider 
the prospect of being punished a salient factor in determining when they will behave 
aggressively.12 
Such early acts of violence and aggression are symptoms of conduct disorder. Children 
with conduct disorder often violate rules, resulting in juvenile detention and school sanctions 
(i.e., suspension, expulsion). Violent and antisocial behavior also has consequences for 
interpersonal relationships. Children with conduct disorder often struggle to develop and 
maintain quality friendships (Green, Gilchrist, Burton, & Cox, 2000). 
The developmental evidence suggests that psychopaths grow up differently than typically 
developing children. They are more likely to have encounters with law enforcement, are not 
deterred by punishment, make fewer friends, come up with their own strategies for 
understanding the emotions of others, and do not feel the interpersonal consequences of harmful 
behavior. 
2.3 Moral Responsibility, Moral Agency, and Exempting Conditions 
In this essay I briefly discuss a positive account of moral responsibility and focus 
primarily on the kinds of conditions that excuse or exempt an individual from moral 
responsibility13. Ignorance can excuse or exempt an individual from moral responsibility14. Some 
                                                
12 This effect is likely present in children more generally (males and females), but studies in this area rarely gather a 
significant number of female participants, if any at all. 
13 This version of moral responsibility is roughly Humean (1888) but is not strictly committed to any Humean 
principles. 
14 This idea is consistent with a wide variety of accounts of moral responsibility, see Fischer and Ravizza (1998) for 
one example. 
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standard examples of ignorance as an exempting condition include young children and 
individuals with severe intellectual deficits. Such individuals will not be held morally 
responsible for their actions because they do not recognize the kinds of stimuli that require a 
morally salient response. In typically developing adults, ignorance can be an excusing condition 
in cases where an individual did not have knowledge of a morally salient stimuli and is not 
culpable for this ignorance. For example, I might offer half of my sandwich to a new coworker 
without knowing that she’s allergic to peanuts. I was not aware of her allergy and would be 
excused from moral responsibility for her subsequent allergic reaction. 
Psychopaths experience a different kind of ignorance. Psychopaths often semantically 
recognize stimuli that require a morally salient response. Hare’s patient, for example, recognized 
the expectation that he should feel remorse for the harm he caused to others. He knew that 
murder, rape, extortion, etc. are morally wrong actions. Psychopaths experience a kind of 
emotional ignorance – they cannot recognize compassion-relevant stimuli. This compassion 
ignorance leads to a failure to act morally in situations where compassion is a significant factor. 
For example, we might think of a man who is angry at his boss for unfairly terminating his 
employment. The boss chose to fire this man even though he was more experienced and better 
qualified for his job than many of his coworkers who were not fired. The man shows up in his 
boss’s office with a gun, ready to murder her for this injustice. The boss pleads for her life. She 
tells him that she’s a single mother with a sick son and needs to stay alive to care for him. If the 
man is not a psychopath, he will likely feel some degree of compassion for this woman and her 
son. He may change his plan, aiming to painfully injure her rather than shooting her in the head. 
He may also feel this compassion and suppress it, deciding to go through with his plan despite 
her pleading. Whatever action he chooses, her plea will be recognized as an instance where 
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compassion is relevant. If, on the other hand, the man is a psychopath he will most likely stick to 
his regular plan. He will hear her plea but fail to recognize it as an instance where compassion is 
relevant. He will not be tempted to feel compassion for her. If he does change his mind, the 
change will be caused by something other than his compassion for the woman and her son. 
Conversely, we can generally agree that most of the adult population is capable of moral 
agency in some degree. According to Vargas (2013), individuals have moral agency in so far as 
they possess the “capacity to offer and exchange in reasons-giving” (p. 139). On this account, 
agents are held morally responsible when they are capable of generating reasons for their actions. 
In this sense, agents are reasons-responsive and able to be held morally responsible for their 
actions. Vargas’s notion of moral responsibility includes all of the cases we are interested in, 
while excluding cases of individuals who are not acting as moral agents.15  
In this essay I focus on a particular kind of reasons-responsiveness: compassion 
sensitivity. For example, a typically developing adult woman who deliberately murders her 
partner while he is sleeping can demonstrate her reasons-responsiveness by engaging in a 
discussion about what motivated her actions – how she planned to collect his life insurance and 
start a new life with her long-time lover (reasons for her actions). Upon further discussion, she 
may also admit that she knows the action was morally wrong. Even if she does not feel 
compassion toward her deceased partner, she can imagine attempting the same action on her new 
partner but ultimately feeling the force of her compassion towards him and his suffering. On the 
other hand, an adult with severe cognitive deficits may not be able discuss his motivational 
reasons for stealing a necklace from a neighbor’s house. He cannot engage in a discussion about 
                                                
15 The view I present here is generally in line with Shoemaker’s (2010) pluralistic notion of moral responsibility. On 
Shoemaker’s view, the psychopath can be held attributability and answersability responsible for his actions but not 
accountability responsible. I agree with Shoemaker but do not want to alienate any portion of my audience that may 
not be on board with his model of moral responsibility. The account of moral responsibility I give here is meant to 
be general; the more theories my view is consistent with, the better. 
 
 
33 
plans to sell the necklace or get revenge on the neighbor because reasons did not play a role in 
his actions. He cannot imagine feeling compassion towards the person he has wronged, even if 
he stole a necklace from his mother or another close relative. In yet another case, an adult with 
no cognitive deficits who meets criteria for psychopathy can usually engage in a discussion about 
her motivational reasons for poisoning her partner (e.g., life insurance money, suspicion of 
infidelity, etc.) but is unable to understand how compassion might have figured in to her actions. 
She cannot imagine feeling compassion toward a partner she loves (or anyone else, for that 
matter) and does not feel the force of compassion in attempting to guide her actions.16 
Lack of compassion sensitivity is not the only way we can fail to be reasons-responsive. 
Borrowing from Fischer and Ravizza (1998), excusing conditions may include ignorance (e.g. 
serving peanut butter without knowing someone is allergic), force (e.g. robbing a bank under 
threat of death), or temporary incapacitation (e.g. under the influence of psychedelic drugs). In 
other words, most of us can be held morally responsible for most of our actions most of the time. 
As I mentioned above, children are temporarily excused from moral responsibility due to 
their levels of ignorance or mental incapacitation. For example, we do not typically consider a 
twelve-year-old fully excused from moral responsibility when she steals from the middle school 
cafeteria. This is where degrees of moral agency and moral responsibility come into play. The 
twelve-year-old who steals from her cafeteria is far less ignorant or incapacitated than the five-
year-old that performs the same action and can engage in a discussion about reasons while the 
five-year-old cannot. The twelve-year-old is thereby considered more morally responsible for her 
actions than the five-year-old. Again, typically developing children grow out of their exemptions 
                                                
16 High-functioning psychopaths are rational agents despite their moral incompetence. Though she feels no 
compassion, the woman murdered her partner may take pains to make it look like an accident and destroy the 
evidence to avoid getting caught. 
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and progress to being held fully morally responsible for most of their actions by the time they 
reach adulthood. 
The developmental trajectory from full exemption from moral responsibility to full moral 
responsibility progresses linearly in typically developing children. As I demonstrated in previous 
sections, psychological research suggests that children with psychopathic traits develop 
differently than children without psychopathic traits, particularly in the areas of emotional 
sensitivity and responsiveness to punishment. I have argued that the aberrant developmental 
trajectory prevents a child with psychopathic traits from developing into a morally mature adult. 
Children with psychopathic traits do not move past the exempting condition of ignorance due to 
severe deficits in compassion sensitivity; they never grasp the compassion component of reasons 
responsiveness.17 Adult psychopaths, therefore, should not be held morally responsible for their 
actions. In future chapters I will analyze the developmental trajectory and adult emotional 
functioning in individuals with other mental disorders – autism spectrum disorder, borderline 
personality disorder, and substance abuse disorder – to determine if such individuals should also 
be exempt from moral responsibility. 
2.4 Objections 
Schiach Borg and Sinnott-Armstrong (2013), in their essay on psychopathy and moral 
judgments, agree that psychopaths demonstrate deficits in compassion sensitivity but conclude: 
“If psychopaths have any deficits or abnormalities in their moral judgments, their deficits seem 
subtle – much more subtle than might be expected from their blatantly abnormal behavior.” Like 
the present essay, the authors cite a wealth of empirical evidence to support their view. 
                                                
17 Psychopaths are incapable of compassion and are thus incapable of caring about their lack of compassion. This 
kind of meta-affective attitude does not affect the psychopath’s moral responsibility, but will be relevant in my 
discussion of other mental disorders, particularly autism spectrum disorders and substance abuse disorders. 
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I have two possible responses to this view. First, Schiach Borg and Sinnott-Armstrong 
may claim that we are discussing two distinct components of the moral decision-making process. 
While I focus on moral salience that allows individuals to detect moral stimuli, they discuss 
moral judgments. On this view we don’t actually disagree: just because psychopaths do not 
demonstrate significant deficits in moral judgment does not mean that they should be held 
morally responsible for their actions. Schiach Borg and Sinnott-Armstrong might argue, 
however, that moral judgment is necessary and sufficient for moral responsibility. Psychopaths 
should be held morally responsible for their actions because they are fully capable of making 
moral judgments. 
This leads to another possible interpretation of their view: Schiach Borg and Sinnott-
Armstrong disagree with my interpretation of the empirical evidence and conclude psychopaths 
are full (or nearly full) moral agents who are fully (or nearly fully) responsible for their actions. 
Alternatively, they could claim that the evidence is insufficient to definitively support one view 
over the other. Either way, my view is capable of addressing their concerns. 
Schiach Borg and Sinnott-Armstrong and I cite the same criteria for psychopathy: Hare’s 
Revised Psychopathy Checklist (p. 108). We differ, however, on the kinds of psychological 
studies we use to support our view. Schiach Borg and Sinnott-Armstrong cite studies assessing 
adults’ (typically in criminal populations) levels of moral reasoning. These studies did not assess 
or were inconclusive about the participants’ emotional response to moral transgressions. The 
authors suggest that the future of research in psychopathy and morality lies in fMRI studies of 
brain activity (p. 124). 
I have suggested that the developmental literature provides unique insight into the moral 
development of children with psychopathic traits and ultimately, high-functioning and low-
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functioning adult psychopaths. The developmental research reveals that burgeoning psychopaths 
have not yet learned to “talk the talk” of morality. Recall that Schwenck and colleagues (2012) 
found that children with psychopathic traits resembling those of an adult, high-functioning 
psychopath could make rational judgments about moral situations but did not demonstrate 
compassion in response to the suffering of others in moral situations. Schiach Borg and Sinnott-
Armstrong’s studies involve adults who have likely learned to provide socially appropriate 
responses to questions about moral behavior. Furthermore, my account of moral responsibility in 
high-functioning psychopathy is consistent with the development of compassion sensitivity in 
children (Hoffman, 2000). Perhaps Schiach Borg and Sinnott-Armstrong could provide a 
developmental story consistent with their arguments, but it is not obvious how their view could 
account for the empirical evidence I have discussed in this essay. 
I do, however, support the call for additional research on psychopathy and moral 
functioning (as Schiach Borg and Sinnott-Armstrong do) especially in adult, non-criminal 
populations. Such studies require broad canvassing of community populations but are not 
impossible. There is at least one promising study in progress studying a variety of personality 
disorders in adult community populations (Gleason, Weinstein, Balsis, & Oltmanns, 2014). 
2.5 Conclusion 
The consequences of this view fly in the face of burning desires for justice: psychopaths 
are not morally responsible for their actions and should not be punished like non-psychopathic 
criminals. When a community reads stories of malicious crimes committed by individuals who 
feel no remorse for their actions, they feel moral outrage. This moral outrage seems justified. 
These kinds of actions disturb the moral order of the community and ought to be condemned. 
When it comes to moral responsibility, however, we should not condemn psychopaths. 
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The horrific acts of psychopaths should be viewed more like the American who fails to 
remove his shoes when he enters a home in India than the college student who cheats on an 
exam. The tourist knows the Indian custom – he frequently visits India and visited throughout his 
childhood – yet the act of wearing his outdoor shoes into the house does not carry an emotional 
force for him. He did not grow up in a culture where wearing outdoor shoes inside felt disgusting 
or offensive so the act does not carry the affective punch that it carries for most individuals 
native to India. He knows the rule and should be expected to follow it, but if he violates the 
custom, this behavior should be viewed as a mistake rather than a deliberate act with malicious 
intent; the tourist has some reduced degree of moral responsibility. If we know that the man is 
generally absent-minded, we might even go as far as to say he is not morally responsible for his 
behavior. Even if the tourist learns the rule, it will not carry the same emotional force as 
someone who grew up in a culture where wearing outdoor shoes inside was considered 
offensive.  
On the other hand, consider a college student who has lived his entire life in a culture 
where cheating is morally wrong. The act carries an emotional force for him and he feels a pang 
of guilt as he copies his classmate’s answers. He also knows the university rules against cheating 
and should be expected to follow them. The college student, unlike the bumbling tourist, is fully 
morally responsible for his behavior. A psychopath is like a bumbling tourist in the moral world; 
moral rules have never carried affective force. 
The comparison between the psychopath and the bumbling tourist looks compelling in 
cases of low-functioning psychopathy. High-functioning psychopaths, on the other hand, seem 
much more like the cheating college student. As I mentioned in the introduction, high-
functioning psychopaths leave relatively normal and successful lives. They usually thrive in 
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society. We have the impulse to say that high-functioning psychopaths know better, that they 
manipulate and exploit their peers with full knowledge of moral rules. The high-functioning 
psychopath arrives at the house in India, knows that he should remove his shoes and that it will 
cause his hosts much discomfort if he does not, and walks proudly through the door, wearing his 
filthiest pair of hiking boots.  
Despite our contempt for characters like Grambling and Hare’s interviewee, we should 
strive to view high-functioning psychopaths like the foreign tourist. Though they semantically 
know the rules of society and the harms caused by their actions, this does not constitute full 
knowledge of one’s actions. High-functioning psychopaths lack the deeper, emotional 
knowledge necessary for full moral agency and responsibility. The high-functioning 
psychopath’s compassion deficit renders her not only exempt from morally agency and 
responsibility, but also makes her extremely dangerous. We should expect high-functioning 
psychopaths to learn and abide by the rules of society (e.g., if the tourist moved to India) and 
impose sanctions for violations. Nonetheless, such sanctions must take into account that the 
psychopath is not morally responsible for her actions. Sanctions against psychopaths should be 
primarily protective (for the rest of society) rather than punitive. 
I have shown that compassion plays a crucial role in detecting moral salience for 
typically developing children and adults. Psychopaths follow a radically different developmental 
trajectory that does not include emotional sensitivity. This deficit persists into adulthood and 
provides an exempting condition for moral responsibility. In the mind of a psychopath, killing 
another human being carries no more affective force than squashing a bug. I will employ a 
similar methodology to evaluate moral responsibility in high-functioning presentations of autism 
spectrum disorders, borderline personality disorder, and substance abuse disorders. While some 
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disorders may prove worthy of exempting conditions similar to psychopathy, others will be 
determined to possess degrees of moral responsibility close to the full moral responsibility of a 
typically developing adult. 
 
 
40 
Works Cited 
American Psychiatric Association. Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders:  
DSM-5. (2013). Washington, D. C.: American Psychiatric Association. 
Birbaumer, N., Veit, R., Lotze, M., Erb, M., Hermann, C., Grodd, W., & Flor, H. (2005).  
Deficient fear conditioning in psychopathy: A functional magnetic resonance imaging  
study. Archives of General Psychiatry 62: 799-805 
Blackburn, R. (1988). “On moral judgments and personality disorders: The myth of  
psychopathic personality revisited.” British Journal of Psychiatry 153: 505-512. 
Blair, R. J. R. (1995). “A cognitive developmental approach to morality: Investigating the  
psychopath.” Cognition 57: 1-29. 
Boldizar, J. P., Perry, D. G., & Perry, L. C. (1989). “Outcome values and aggression.” Child  
Development 60: 571-579. 
Caouette, J. (2013). “Responsibility and psychopathy: Why we do not have special  
obligations to the psychopath.” American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience. 4(2): 26- 
27. 
Cameron, C. D. & Rapier, K. (2017). Compassion is a motivated choice. In W. Sinnott- 
Armstrong & Christian Miller (Eds.), Moral psychology, volume 5: Virtue and  
character (pp. 373-408). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Coplan, A. (2011). Understanding empathy: Its features and effects. In A. Coplan & P.  
Goldie (Eds.) Empathy: Philosophical and psychological perspectives. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press. 3-18. 
Dolan, M. C. & Rennie, C. E. “Is juvenile psychopathy associated with low anxiety and fear  
in conduct-disordered male offenders?” Journal of Anxiety Disorders 21: 1028-1038. 
 
 
41 
Eisenberg, N., McCreath, H., & Ahn, R. (1988).“Vicarious emotional responsiveness and  
prosocial behavior: Their interrelations in young children.” Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin 14(2): 298-311. 
Fischer, J., & Ravizza, M. (1998). Responsibility and control: A theory of moral responsibility.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Gleason, M. E. J., Weinstein, Y., Balsis, S., & Oltmanns, T. F. (2014). “The enduring impact of  
maladaptive personality traits on relationships quality, health, and stressful life  
events in later life.” Journal of Personality 82: 493-501. 
Goetz, J. L., Keltner, D., & Simon-Thomas, E. (2010). “Compassion: An evolutionary analysis  
and empirical review.” Psychological Bulletin 136: 351-375. 
Green, J., Gilchrist, A., Burton, D., & Cox, A. (2000). “Social and psychiatric functioning in  
adolescents with Asperger syndrome compared with conduct disorder.” Journal of  
Autism and Developmental Disorders 30(4): 279-293. 
Hare, R. D. (1999). Without conscience: The disturbing world of psychopaths among us. New  
York, NY: Guilford Press. 
Hare, R. D., Harpur, T. J., Hakstian, A. R., Forth, A. E., Hart, S. D., & Newman, J. P. (1990)  
“The revised psychopathy checklist: Reliability and factor structure.” Psychological  
Assessment 2(3): 338-341. 
Hare, R. D., and Neumann, C. S. (2010). Psychopathy: Assessment and forensic implications. In  
L. Malatesti & J. McMillan (Eds.), Responsibility and psychopathy: Interfacing law,  
psychiatry, and philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hinshaw, S. P. & Zupan, B. A. (1997). Assessment of antisocial behavior in children and  
adolescents. In D. M. Stoff, J. Breiling, & J. D. Maser (Eds.), Handbook of antisocial  
 
 
42 
behavior. New York: NY: Wiley. 
Hoffman, M. (2000). Empathy and moral development: Implications for caring and justice.  
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Hoppenbrouwers, S. S., Van der Stigchel, S., Slotboom, J., Dalmaijer, E. S., & Theeuwes, J.  
(2015). “Disentangling attentional deficits in psychopathy using visual search: Failures in  
the use of contextual information.” Personality and Individual Differences 86: 132-138. 
Hume, D. (1888). A treatise on human nature. Oxford: Claredon Press. 
Jones, A. P., Happé, F. G. E., Gilbert, F., Burnett, S. & Viding, E. (2010). “Feeling, caring,  
knowing: different types of empathy deficit in boys with psychopathic tendencies and  
autism spectrum disorder.” Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 51(11): 1188- 
1197.  
Kennett, J. (2010). Reasons, emotion, and moral judgment in the psychopath. In L. Malatesti  
(Ed.) Responsibility and psychopathy: Interfacing law, psychiatry, and philosophy (pp.  
243-259). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Kennett, J. (2003). Autism, empathy and moral agency. The Philosophical Quarterly 52(208),  
340-357. 
Kiehl, K. (2014). The psychopath whisperer: The science of those without conscience.  
New York: Random House. 
Kimonis, E. R., Frick, P. J., Skeem, J. L., Marsee, M. A., Cruise, K., Munoz, L. C., Aucoin, K.  
J., & Morris, A. M. (2008). “Assessing callous-unemotional traits in adolescent  
offenders: Validation of the inventory of callous-unemotional traits.” International  
Journal of Law and Psychiatry 31: 241-252.  
Levenson, M. R., Kiehl, K. A., & Fitzpatrick, C. M. (1995). “Assessing psychopathic attributes  
 
 
43 
in a noninstitutional population.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 68: 151-
158. 
Maibom, H. L. (2008). The mad, the bad, and the psychopath. Neuroethics 1: 167-184. 
Maiese, M. (2014). Moral cognition, affect, and psychopathy. Philosophical Psychology 27(6),  
807-828. 
Morgan, A. & Lilienfeld, S. (2000). A meta-analytic review of the relation between antisocial  
behavior and neuropsychological measures of executive function.” Clinical Psychology  
Review 20(1), 113-136. 
Mullins-Nelson, J. T., Salekin, R. T., & Leistico, A. M. (2006). Psychopathy, empathy, and  
perspective-taking ability in a community sample: Implications for the successful  
psychopathy concept. International Journal of Forensic Mental Health 5(2), 133-149. 
Newman, J. P., Curtin, J. J., Bertsch, J. D., & Baskin-Sommers, A. R. (2010). Attention  
moderates the fearlessness of psychopathic offenders. Biological Psychiatry 67(1),  
66-70. 
Pardini, D. A., Lochman, J. E., & Frick, P. J. (2003). Callous/Unemotional traits in social- 
cognitive process in adjudicated youths. Journal of the American Academy of Child and  
Adolescent Psychiatry 42(3), 364-371. 
Ressler, R., & Burgess, A. (1985). Crime scene and profile characteristics of organized and  
disorganized murders. FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 54(8), 18-25. 
Rosner, B. (1990). Swindle: How a man named John Grambling, Jr., cheated banks out of  
millions. Homewood, Ill.: Business One Irwin. 
Schaich Borg & Sinnott-Armstrong. (2013). Do psychopaths make moral  
judgments? In W. Sinnott-Armstrong and K. Kiehl (Eds.), Handbook of psychopathy  
 
 
44 
and law (pp. 107-128). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Schwenck, C., Mergenthaler, J., Keller, K., Zech, J., Salehi, S., Taurines, R., Romanos, M.,  
Schecklmann, M., Schneider, W., Warnke, A., and Freitag, C. M. (2012). Empathy in  
children with autism and conduct disorder: group-specific profiles and developmental  
aspects. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 53(6), 651-659. 
Shoemaker, D. (2010). Responsibility, agency, and cognitive disability. In E. F.  
Kittay & L. Carlson (Eds.), Cognitive disability and its challenge to moral  
philosophy (pp. 201-223). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Strawson, P. (2003). Freedom and resentment. In G. Watson (Ed.), Free will (2nd ed.). Oxford:  
Oxford University Press. 
Vargas, M. (2013). Building better beings: A theory of moral responsibility. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press. 
Zahn-Waxler, C. & Radke-Yarrow, M. (1990). The origins of empathic concern. Motivation and  
Emotion 14(2), 107-130. 
 
 
45 
Chapter 3: “Check(ing) out” of Moral Responsibility: 
Understanding Addiction as an Impairment in  
Emotion Regulation 
 
3.1 Introduction 
When I asked a group of adolescent substance users who had faced legal sanctions for 
drug offenses if they were morally responsible for their actions, they all, much to my surprise, 
said yes. It was their own fault that they used drugs, made poor decisions, and ended up in 
treatment. Similarly, adult programs like Alcoholics Anonymous encourage accountability for 
one’s behavior. It seems counterproductive and perhaps even paternalistic to suggest that addicts 
are not morally responsible for at least some of their behaviors.  
The solution, according to some ethicists, comes in degrees. Sinnott-Armstrong (2013), 
for example, argues that an addict’s moral responsibility varies in proportion to her degree of 
control over her addiction. The adolescents in the support group or members of AA are coming 
out of an addiction. These individuals are regaining a sense of control and thus a sense of moral 
responsibility for their actions. While I agree with Sinnott-Armstrong’s endorsement of moral 
responsibility in degrees, I disagree with his conclusion that degrees of moral responsibility vary 
with levels of control.  
Rather than facing difficult emotions, individuals with emotion regulation deficits use 
maladaptive coping strategies (e.g. self-harm, substance abuse, suicidal thoughts/attempts, etc.) 
to escape. I am focusing specifically on those who use substance(s) to compensate. In this essay I 
offer an empirically-based moral account of substance abuse that proposes explanations for 
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relapse as well as why certain circumstances (e.g. financial difficulties, significant life events, 
war) make substances more enticing.  
Substance use as a coping strategy is demonstrated by studies like Robins, Davis, and 
Goodwin (1974) that found that 20% of a sample of enlisted men self-reported being addicted to 
heroin while serving in Vietnam. Similarly, I spoke with one adolescent substance user in a 
treatment facility whose parents had recently divorced and who was struggling in school. The 
adolescent felt “angry and depressed” and “wanted to check out…I didn’t want to deal with it” 
so the adolescent took a daily mix of substances that allowed them to feel numb. 
 Deficits in emotion regulation excuse individuals with substance use disorder from moral 
responsibility. Emotion regulation skills develop in adolescence and are a crucial component of 
morality. Treating deficits in emotion regulation through substance use affects individual 
performance across interpersonal and mental health domains as well. Emotion regulation deficits 
in addiction provide general excusing conditions for moral responsibility. In other words, 
individuals with substance use disorder are excused from moral responsibility for addiction-
related behaviors as well as moral behaviors across all domains of their lives. 
The emotion regulation view is one of several potential philosophical conceptions of 
moral responsibility in substance use. In the next section I will define addiction using DSM-5 
criteria for substance use disorder. I will then discuss the role of emotion regulation in moral 
development. Synthesizing the psychological data with philosophical views on moral 
responsibility, I will formulate the emotion regulation view. I will argue that the emotion 
regulation view is more plausible than alternative views for understanding morality and 
addiction. The emotion regulation view explains etiology, pathology, treatment, and recovery in 
addiction.  
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3.2 Diagnosing Addiction: Substance Use Disorder 
 3.2.1 DSM-5 Criteria 
As I mentioned, I will discuss addiction as a mental illness. Clinically, addiction is 
classified as substance use disorders and, like major depression, autism spectrum disorders, and 
schizophrenia, substance use disorders are delineated in the DSM-5 by general characteristics as 
well as specific symptoms. Specific symptoms vary depending on the substance and/or the stage 
of the use (general use, intoxication, withdrawal, and other induced or unspecified related 
disorders)18 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The diagnostic criteria acknowledge that 
individuals often use multiple types of substances at once (e.g. opioids and alcohol) or use one 
substance to curb the withdraw effects of another (e.g. cigarettes at rehab facilities), resulting in 
regular comorbid diagnoses within the “Substance-Related and Addictive Disorders” category. 
Additionally, substance use disorders are comorbid with other mental illnesses but I will discuss 
this further in the following section. 
 Roughly all substance use disorder diagnostic criteria consist of five main categories: 
impaired control, social impairment, risky use, tolerance, and withdrawal (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). Impaired control symptoms include things like drinking more alcohol than 
you intended, wanting to cut back on smoking but failing to follow through, and doing whatever 
is necessary, even if that means compromising your values, to obtain your substance of choice. 
Social impairment symptoms include things like forgetting to pick your kids up from school 
because you were high, losing your job due to substance use, and continuing to use substances 
despite conflicts with family and friends. Risky use symptoms include sharing needles with 
                                                
18 For hallucinogens there is also “Hallucinogen Persisting Perception Disorder.” This category is unique to 
hallucinogens and not relevant to the broader discussion. 
 
 
48 
potentially infected strangers in order to get high, using hallucinogens despite persistent 
terrifying trips, and continuing to use substances despite heightened risk of being caught by law 
enforcement and/or increased penalties. Tolerance symptoms involve the need for an increased 
amount of the substance in order to achieve the desired effect and vary according to the 
physiological makeup of the individual and the substance. Similarly, withdrawal symptoms vary 
by individual and substance and occur when the individual is no longer using the substance.  
 3.2.2 Comorbidity  
Comorbidity complicates moral responsibility. As I discuss in other chapters, different 
mental disorders have distinct effects on moral responsibility. These diverse effects are not my 
focus in this essay. I am concerned with substance use as a stand-alone disorder despite the fact 
that such cases rarely occur in vivo. I argue that substance use disorder alone is often sufficient 
to render an individual excused from moral responsibility. Substance use disorder is often 
comorbid with other conditions including post-traumatic stress disorder (De Bellis, 2002; Robert, 
Roberts, Jones, & Bisson, 2015; Grant et al, 2016), mood disorders, anxiety disorders 
(Campbell-Sills & Barlow, 2007; Grant et al, 2016), and personality disorders (Grant et al, 
2016). In cases where substance use disorder is not sufficient to excuse an individual from moral 
responsibility, it may be the case that her comorbid mental disorders combined with substance 
use disorder excuse her from moral responsibility. I will not speculate on such cases here. 
3.3 Emotion Regulation 
Before we dive into the crux of the moral argument, we must first discuss the role of 
emotion regulation in moral development. Primitive emotion regulation strategies emerge in 
early childhood and mature into adolescence (Hilt, L. M., Hanson, J. L., & Pollak, S. D., 2011; 
Masters, 1991). We regulate our emotions for our own benefit (personal) or for the benefit of 
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others (social) (Masters, 1991). A child, for example, may develop strategies to suppress his 
sadness when his parents argue because he has learned that his sadness causes him discomfort 
(personal) and/or that when his mother observes him crying she becomes more upset (social).  
As children mature, they develop more cognitive complex strategies across both personal 
and social domains and, if all goes well, become more skilled at emotion regulation. However, 
not all strategies are created equal. Strategies are deemed adaptive or maladaptive depending on 
their effectiveness in reducing distress without creating further problems like depression or 
anxiety (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010). For example, if an adolescent has a bad 
first date she might find it soothing to think about everything that went wrong over and over 
again, engaging in a practice called rumination. She may even engage some of her peers who 
have had similar experiences with dates and they may all discuss their negative experiences over 
and over in co-rumination. Though common, both practices are considered maladaptive, 
ineffective methods for regulating emotions. In many cases such maladaptive practices persist 
into adulthood. 
 To correct these practices, emotion regulation features prominently in major schools of 
therapy, including cognitive behavioral (CBT) and dialectical behavioral (DBT) (Gratz & 
Roemer, 2004; Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; Linehan, 1993). Patients are taught 
strategies to tolerate distress and regulate impulsive responses to live healthier, more socially 
cohesive lifestyles. Studies have shown that individuals who practice maladaptive emotion 
regulation strategies like suppression or avoidance are more likely to experience more symptoms 
of psychopathology than individuals who employ adaptive strategies like problem solving and 
cognitive reappraisal (understanding the function of the emotion and its relevance to one’s goals) 
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(Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Aldao & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2012; Aldao, Jazaieri, Golden, & Gross, 
2014).  
Individuals with poor emotion regulation skills often experience difficulties pursuing 
goals while under emotional duress, maintaining meaningful relationships, and suffer from mood 
and/or anxiety disorders (Gratz & Roemer, 2004; Campbell-Sills & Barlow, 2007; Linehan, 
1993; Phan & Sripada, 2013). It is important to note that both CBT and DBT believe that deficits 
in emotion regulation can be treated. I will return to this conclusion in the next section. 
On the neural level, emotion regulation is thought to help direct our attention towards 
relevant stimuli (Lewis, 2013). For example, if I cannot regulate my fear about an email that my 
boss is supposed to send me in the next week, I might find myself refreshing my inbox while 
driving, causing me to hit a pedestrian in the crosswalk. I could not tolerate my fear, nor could I 
come up with a healthy coping mechanism (another emotion regulation skill), thus I performed 
an immoral action. Not all instances of poor emotion regulation result in immoral action but the 
example demonstrates that emotion regulation affects behavior in surprising ways. 
 The research I’ve presented shows that an individual must possess some basic emotion 
regulation skills to be psychologically healthy. Most of us develop these skills in adolescence. 
Some of us need therapy to help hone our skills. This essay focuses on the large group of 
individuals who do not develop emotion regulation skills in childhood or therapy but turn to 
substances to aid in distress tolerance, impulse control, etc. I have demonstrated in this section 
that these individuals are operating at a significant psychological disadvantage. 
3.4 Moral Implications 
Individuals with substance use disorder and related conditions are excused from moral 
responsibility because of deficits in emotion regulation. The previous section established that 
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individuals with untreated deficits in emotion regulation are at a significant psychological 
disadvantage to individuals with typically developed emotion regulation skills. To understand 
this thesis, we must first understand what it means to be excused from moral responsibility. 
Borrowing from Fischer and Ravizza (1998), excusing conditions may include ignorance (e.g. 
serving peanut butter without knowing someone is allergic), force (e.g. robbing a bank under 
threat of death), or temporary incapacitation (e.g. fallen ill with the flu). Individuals who are 
excused from moral responsibility, unlike individuals who are exempt, can overcome their 
excusing conditions and once again be morally responsible for their actions.  
On my view, an individual with substance use disorder qualifies under something like 
ignorance, as we can see in the discussion of emotion regulation. To be even more precise, we 
can think of emotion regulation as a capacity required for moral responsibility. Vargas (2013) 
argues that individuals have a capacity for detecting moral considerations and a capacity for self-
control. He claims that these capacities can be exercised or fail to be exercised depending on the 
context. Only systemic failures of these capacities constitute grounds for exempting conditions. 
For example, if I recognize the moral salience of the situation but fail to exercise self-control and 
eat the piece of cake I was supposed to save for my partner but typically exercise self-control 
when faced with delicious desserts that do not belong to me, I would not be exempt from moral 
responsibility. If, on the other hand, I have a condition that impairs my ability to recognize the 
moral salience of this situation and/or exercise self-control (e.g. I am child, have severe 
intellectual impairments, suffer from Prader-Willi syndrome, etc.), I would be exempt from 
moral responsibility in all relevant situations. There may also be isolated instances where we 
think that an individual is responsible for most of her actions but is excused in a particular 
context at a particular time. If I come home intoxicated, for instance, and eat the cake that I know 
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belongs to my partner my moral responsibility would be (at the very least) mitigated on Vargas’s 
view. 
We can summarize Vargas’s view as follows: moral responsibility is assessed on a case-
by-case basis. Some individuals have impairments that span multiple situations but in general, a 
person who is exempt in one context will be responsible in others. Vargas seems to think that 
global views of responsibility – an individual is exempt/responsible in all cases – are 
implausible. While I agree that all individuals will fail to be responsible in some possible 
context, I do find it plausible to posit that some individuals can be exempt from moral 
responsibility in all possible contexts. Recall at the outset of the discussion of moral 
responsibility that I stated that emotion regulation is a capacity. One might argue that emotion 
regulation falls under Vargas’s self-governance, but as I concluded in the previous section, 
emotion regulation involves tolerating distress and finding healthy outlets for emotional 
experiences. We cannot, therefore, relegate emotion regulation to a subsidiary of self-governance 
or as a part of detecting moral salience (Vargas’s other morally relevant capacity). Emotion 
regulation affects both of these capacities and so much more.  
Emotion regulation should be considered a capacity in its own right. Vargas may be 
willing to accept this addition to his view but I also argue that deficits in emotion regulation can 
constitute global exemption from moral responsibility. As I mentioned, Vargas does not support 
global exemptions and argues instead for considering cases individually. As I discussed in the 
previous section outlining the clinical criteria for substance use disorder, the condition affects 
multiple domains of the individual’s life. This position is consistent with other views of 
addiction (such as Sinnott-Armstrong’s (2013) control view which I will discuss in depth in the 
following section) as well as the DSM-5’s description of substance use disorder as a 
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comprehensive disorder that affects every aspect of the individual’s life (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013). 
Unlike psychopathy where deficits in compassion are irreparable, individuals with 
substance use disorder and related conditions can learn strategies for emotion regulation through 
therapy. Depending on the program, an individual with substance use disorder may or may not 
learn emotion regulation strategies in rehab. My argument does not claim that an individual with 
substance use disorder is excused from moral responsibility until they go to rehab; they must 
learn emotion regulation strategies before they can be considered fully morally responsible for 
their actions. For the sake of argument we will assume that an individual enters a rehabilitation 
facility with sufficient chemical detox and therapeutic support. We will also assume that they are 
receiving DBT (though CBT would be equally effective). How does this individual learn 
emotion regulation strategies? 
Briefly, the individual will work with an individual therapist and attend group therapy. In 
group they will learn various skills, including specific strategies for emotion regulation. For 
example, rather than relaxing with a beer after a long day of work, an individual might help her 
son with his homework (contributing), go see a play (vacation), or practice yoga (relaxation).  
She will also do her best to get plenty of sleep and exercise, eat well, and go to the doctor when 
needed (PLEASE). Additionally, she will be more aware of her emotions. If her emotion does 
not fit a particular situation (e.g. if she is angry at her spouse for no apparent reason) she will act 
contrary to that emotion to try to change it (e.g. doing something nice for her spouse) (Linehan, 
1993). Through individual and group therapy she can learn how these skills (and others) serve as 
more effective methods of emotion regulation than substance use. 
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Despite the promise of skill-based therapy, we seem to have problem. If the individual is 
excused from moral responsibility, she is not morally obligated to participate in therapy or 
develop emotion regulation strategies. I concede this point but do not think the problem is 
devastating. Substance use disorder does not render an individual completely irrational. The 
individual may still be fighting cravings and struggle to manage her emotions, but this does not 
mean that most individuals, when given a fair opportunity, will not try to get better. 
The relapse data on substance use disorder, however, seems to tell a different story. First, 
some individuals leave treatment programs early (Hopwood et al, 2015) and do not spend 
enough time in therapy to develop emotion regulation skills. These cases are the burden of the 
treatment facility to find creative solutions for engaging clients rather than the subject of moral 
arguments. Relapse rates for individuals who complete rehabilitation programs range from 40-
60% 6-12 months after treatment (McLellan et al, 2000). These rates suggest that many (if not 
most) substance users continue to be excused from moral responsibility (per my standards) even 
after treatment. 
As the authors of the meta-analysis that published these rates acknowledge, 40-60% 
covers individuals sent to all kinds of treatment facilities, many of whom received no follow up 
care such as group or individual therapy once they were discharged. These rates include 
individuals who were discharged prematurely (by therapeutic standards) due to overcrowding or 
insurance limitations. Additional research should focus on the attrition and relapse rates facilities 
using empirically informed therapy (e.g. CBT or DBT).  
Studies have demonstrated that once individuals with substance use disorder learn 
adaptive emotion regulation strategies they are more likely to continue treatment (Hopwood et al, 
2015), participate in fewer impulsive behaviors (Tull et al, 2012), and experience improvements 
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in mood (Axelrod et al, 2011). Despite this empirical data I think it is worthwhile to revisit 
Sinnott-Armstrong’s control view a final time to make sure the emotion regulation view is more 
explanatory.  
3.5 Alternate Views 
You might think that moral responsibility in substance use only becomes problematic 
after an individual is hooked on a particular drug or sometime after her first use. I call this view 
“first use.” Alternatively, we might distinguish moral responsibility based on types of 
substances. On the “types of substances” view one might argue that some substances affect 
moral responsibility in users more than others. Finally, I discuss the “cognitive impairments” 
view. On this view, the most interesting discussion of moral responsibility in substance use 
resides in cases of substance use-induced cognitive impairments. In this section I briefly discuss 
each of these views and explain why they do not provide the most philosophically interesting 
discussion of moral responsibility.  
 3.5.1 First Use 
 Some philosophers may be tempted to assign moral responsibility at first use of an 
addictive substance. We might think of this view as a response to the intuition that someone who 
is addicted to a substance has little control over her actions. When she first inserted the needle 
into her arm, however, she was not in the throes of a craving or the pangs of withdrawal. The 
substance had not sunk its hooks into her impulse control and decision-making. She seems to 
have made the decision to try drugs freely and thereby seems morally responsible for this 
decision. From this initial responsibility, the first use view can argue that substance user is 
responsible in general. In other words, because the substance user is responsible for her first use 
she does not qualify for excusing or exempting conditions due to her substance use.  
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Sinnott-Armstrong (2013) calls this “transference” and argues that most users would not 
be held morally responsible on this view due to ignorance or because their first use came from 
legal prescription drugs. Furthermore, the strategy of assigning blame at first use seems 
obviously problematic for individuals who ultimately generalize to other opiates (e.g. heroin) 
whose first use came as part of a legal, legitimate medical procedure. I argue that this strategy is 
problematic for individuals who do not fall into any of these categories – individuals whose first 
use came in the form of snorting cocaine or injecting heroin.  
 The first use response seems problematic for legal substances like alcohol, nicotine, and 
in many areas, marijuana. For legal substances, there is a widespread belief that universal 
abstinence is not necessary to prevent addiction. In cases of familial inheritance, the argument 
becomes more complex. I will not address cases of familial inheritance for legal or illegal 
substances in this essay. The same argument applies for pain medications. Pain medications are 
necessary for certain medical procedures and should be prescribed responsibly. Again, universal 
abstinence does not seem like a popular option.  
 Illegal substances face a much less accepting audience. When I discuss the recent spate of 
heroin overdoses in my small Kentucky hometown I hear the same message over and over “they 
never should’ve tried it in the first place.” The logic seems to follow that once an individual 
sticks the needle into her arm for the time, she has chosen her fate, mortally and morally.  
 Many individuals turn to substances to cope with mental disorders. Others start using in 
adolescence, when their rational and moral mind is still under construction. Some might start 
using while under the influence of other substances like alcohol or under pressure from a 
controlling partner. The reasons for putting the needle in one’s arm or snorting the line are 
numerous but the magnitude of the effects is beyond comprehension. The fact remains that the 
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vast majority of people cannot imagine what their life will be like as an addict.  Owen Flanagan 
(2011) describes his experience with his drug of choice, alcohol, but the substance could be 
replaced with any drug:  
…I now spent most conscious, awake, time drinking, wanting to die. But afraid to die. 
When you’re dead you can’t use. I lived to use and to die. The desire to live was not 
winning the battle over death. The overwhelming need – the pathological, unstoppable – 
need to use, was. Living was just a necessary condition of using. (277) 
 
Even ignoring the moral consequences – no one would choose a life like this. We cannot hold 
someone morally responsible for all of the actions of the addict when they use a substance for the 
first time. 
 3.5.2 Types of Substances 
I did not make any moral distinctions based on types of substances. As the discussion 
above foreshadowed, I do not think an individual who abuses nicotine is more or less morally 
responsible than an individual who abuses cocaine. Some substances may correlate with higher 
levels of moral responsibility since they are often used by psychologically healthy individuals – 
for example, a psychologically healthy individual who smokes cigarettes and cheats on her taxes 
would likely be held morally responsible for cheating on her taxes.  
 On the other hand, some might argue that illegal substances like heroin, 
methamphetamine, and cocaine come from dubious sources in addition to being dangerous. Such 
substances are commonly depicted in popular culture through television shows like Breaking 
Bad and Narcos as well as countless news reports of seized meth labs below daycares or mass 
graves of enemies of the Cartel. According to this argument, a reasonable adult should be 
concerned not only for their own well being when using substances like methamphetamine, 
heroin, and cocaine but also the well being of their community that clearly suffers from the 
proliferation of these substances. 
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 My first response to this argument is to reiterate my reply about first use: individuals 
using drugs like heroin, methamphetamine, and cocaine usually have no idea the magnitude of 
what they are doing. Should they be thinking about the effects of their use on the broader 
community? Perhaps, but I do not think this is a strict moral ‘should’ that is any stronger than 
individuals who drink alcohol without considering sexist advertising campaigns and deaths from 
drunk driving, or individuals who buy chocolate without researching the supply chain. In other 
words, the moral obligation to consider the damage of hard drugs to one’s community is 
something like a weak moral duty that does not make an individual’s use of these substances 
morally different in any meaningful way. 
 On the other hand, we might be concerned about excusing nicotine users from moral 
responsibility. Nicotine addicts are often indistinguishable from typically functioning adults – 
they do not find themselves in trouble with the law, checking themselves into rehab facilities, or 
struggling to maintain jobs or relationships. As I will discuss in the next section detailing the 
specifics of substance use disorder, not everyone that uses a substance meets clinical criteria for 
substance use disorder. Individuals who drink a few beers on the weekends are not alcoholics 
and many individuals who use nicotine do not meet criteria for substance use disorder. Substance 
use disorder involves significant impairments in multiple aspects of functioning. The 
impairments in emotion regulation, I argue, affect moral responsibility. Individuals who use 
nicotine can suffer from substance use disorder and impairments in emotion regulations and can 
thereby be excused from moral responsibility. 
 3.5.3 Cognitive Impairments 
We could also argue that individuals with substance use disorder are excused from moral 
responsibility due to cognitive impairments. Prolonged alcoholism, for example, can result in 
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memory deficits, frontal lobe impairment, and in rare cases, dementia (Theotoka, 2006; Vandrey 
& Mintzer, 2009). Long-term opioid users often demonstrate deficits in decision-making and 
other impairments commonly associated with frontal lobe functioning (Gruber, Silveri, & 
Yurgelun-Todd, 2007). Even prolonged cannabis use resulted in decreased performance on 
decision-making, attention, memory, and problem-solving tasks when compared with controls 
(summarized in Vandrey & Mintzer, 2009). Except for serious alcohol- induced conditions like 
dementia, most of the impairments caused by prolonged use can be reversed by prolonged 
abstinence. While using substances or during the early stages of recovery, however, an individual 
with substance use disorder will likely have some cognitive impairments. 
Severe, permanent cognitive impairments exempt some individuals with substance use 
disorder from moral responsibility. Individuals who experience near fatal overdoses, for 
example, may have permanent, severe brain damage due to loss of oxygen. Barring major 
developments in neuroscience, these individuals are permanently exempt from moral 
responsibility. Other individuals might have temporary, substance-induced impairments in 
decision-making, impulse control, or even memory that are sufficient to excuse them from moral 
responsibility. A man with severe prolonged alcoholism, for example, may leave his young child 
at home alone for twenty-four hours without food or water because he forgot it was his weekend 
to take care of his son. If the man has severe memory deficits, we might argue that he is not 
morally responsible for his actions (and that he is unfit for unsupervised visits). 
 While such cases may be common, I do not think that all cases of moral wrongs 
committed by individuals with substance use disorder can be resolved by referencing cognitive 
impairments. I cannot give even an approximate number of cases but I do believe that there are 
plenty of interesting cases to discuss without referencing cognitive impairments. I endorse the 
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notion that many individuals with substance use disorder should be exempt from moral 
responsibility due to severe cognitive impairments but will demonstrate in this essay that the 
most philosophically interesting cases are those in which the individual does not suffer severe 
cognitive impairments.  
In this section I have discussed three views on moral responsibility in substance use. I 
argued that each of these views was insufficient. The first use view is based on an inaccurate 
understanding of why individuals try substances and the amount of knowledge available about 
the consequences of substance abuse. Next, I considered distinguishing moral responsibility 
based on types of substances. I argued that this view fails to capture the vast individual 
differences observed in substance use disorder. Finally, I argued that while some individuals 
with substance use disorder suffer from cognitive impairments, most do not and the most 
interesting ethical questions surround individuals with substance use disorder who do not have 
cognitive impairments. 
3.6 Objections – the Control View 
Sinnott-Armstrong (2013) argues that whether or not an individual with substance use 
disorder (he uses the term addict19) is morally responsible depends on how much control she has 
over her actions. Her level of control comes in degrees and depends on a variety of factors 
including environment (e.g. resisting a drink in a bar versus at home) and risk factors (e.g. would 
she quit at the prospect of losing her job). Higher levels of addiction result in lower degrees of 
control and moral responsibility on this view. 
 He also distinguishes between individuals who are addicted to substances and heavy 
users of substances. Sinnott-Armstrong (2013) argues that heavy users differ from addicts 
                                                
19 I do not believe that I have altered Sinnott-Armstrong’s argument by using “individual with substance use 
disorder” rather than “addict.” My term is consistent with the psychological literature and captures the individuals 
Sinnott-Armstrong discusses in his essay. 
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because they are in full control of their substance use; a heavy user could quit at any time. Since 
they are in full control of their use they are also fully morally responsible for their actions. On 
the emotion regulation view, however, a heavy user could be considered equal to an addict in 
terms of moral responsibility. As long as both met criteria for substance use disorder and both 
were using substances to regulate their emotions, both would be excused from moral 
responsibility. This seems like a problem for the emotion regulation view if you share Sinnott-
Armstrong’s intuitions about control and heavy users. 
 My response is two-fold. First, I want to agree with Sinnott-Armstrong in some cases. 
Take a business executive whose firm entertains potential clients at drinking events three or four 
times a week. She drinks more than the average person but this is explained by the demands of 
her career. She is not using alcohol to cope, rather, she uses alcohol as part of a social ritual that 
is well accepted in her field. Her drinking does not cause problems in her social life and actually 
advances her career. It is unlikely that she has ever been in trouble with the law or that she drinks 
to the point of physical illness. If she were promoted and found herself spending less time with 
clients and less time at drinking events, she would not feel compelled to keep drinking heavily. 
The business executive, on Sinnott-Armstrong’s view, is a heavy user and is morally responsible 
for her actions. This is consistent with the emotion regulation view because she is not using 
alcohol to cope with her emotions and she does not meet the criteria for substance use disorder. 
 Other cases, by Sinnott-Armstrong’s own admission, are less clear-cut. He discusses 
several variations of cases involving doctors who self-prescribe narcotics (Sinnott-Armstrong, 
2013). When caught and threatened with their job, most enter treatment and successfully stop 
using. In one case the doctor does not stop using when his wife leaves him but only after he faces 
losing his job. Sinnott-Armstrong argues that the prospect of losing one’s job is a kind of 
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coercion and struggles with whether or not to call the decision to quit at this point an exercise of 
control. Recall that on his view degree of control mediates degree of moral responsibility. If we 
cannot determine the degree to which someone is in control of their actions, we cannot determine 
their degree of moral responsibility.   
 Sinnott-Armstrong does not offer a solution to this problem so we are left to sort out the 
heavy users from the addicts on our own. The emotion regulation view, on the other hand, allows 
us to avoid making the distinction between heavy users and addicts. The emotion regulation view 
relies on clinical criteria to determine when substance use is problematic and calls on the cause 
to explain why users are excused from moral responsibility. Additionally, the emotion regulation 
view, unlike the control view, can explain how individuals recover from substance use disorder 
and regain full moral responsibility. 
 On the control view it is unclear how an individual who has very little control begins to 
regain control. Perhaps it starts with an act of coercion such as court-ordered treatment or the 
prospect of losing one’s job. Once an individual begins to regain control through treatment, the 
path of recovery should be linear with the individual regaining more and more control until she is 
cured. As I mentioned in the previous section, however, this is rarely the case as many 
individuals relapse despite treatment. How do we explain relapse on the control view? It seems 
unlikely that the individuals are leaving treatment and walking into truly coercive situations (e.g. 
someone forcing a needle into your arm). It is more likely, as I discussed earlier, that individuals 
leave treatment and walk into stressful situations that they are not used to handling without the 
help of substances.  
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 You could take a hardline with the control view and argue that individuals who relapse 
are fully morally responsible for their actions.20 Completing rehab voids any excusing conditions 
they previously possessed. This position fails to capture the nuances of substance use disorder. 
Furthermore, the emotion regulation view not only excuses the individuals who relapse from 
moral responsibility but it predicts and explains why some individuals do not quit successfully 
after their first round of treatment. 
 While many aspects of Sinnott-Armstrong’s control view may appear compelling, I have 
argued that the emotion regulation view provides a more robust explanation of substance use 
disorder across individualized presentations and better fits the known relapse data in recovery. 
Though it may be useful to discuss degrees of control, we should not rely on control as a 
measure of moral responsibility in substance use disorder. 
3.7 Conclusion 
Thorny clinical and moral issues surround substance use disorder. I attempted to extract 
and explicate the ones most relevant to my thesis, namely: many individuals with substance use 
disorder are excused from moral responsibility due to deficits in emotion regulation. I established 
the fundamental role of emotion regulation in moral functioning and argued that the deficits in 
substance use disorder are not insurmountable. In the beginning I discussed several alternate 
approaches to substance use and morality and summarily found each to be unsatisfactory. My 
approach accounts for the functioning impairments caused by deficits in emotion regulation 
while maintaining a sense of autonomy for the recovering addict.  An individual with substance 
use disorder is not permanently “checked out” of moral responsibility; by participating in 
treatment he gains freedom from addiction and reentry into the moral community. 
                                                
20 Unless they become addicted again at which point they will no longer be morally responsible. 
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Chapter 4: Borderline Personality Disorder:  
The Moral Superheroes Virtue Ethics Needs 
 
4.1 Introduction 
“My whole experience of these episodes was that someone else was doing it; it was like ‘I know 
this is coming, I’m out of control, somebody help me; where are you, God?’ I felt totally empty, 
like the Tin Man; I had no way to communicate what was going on, no way to understand it.” 
  
Dr. Marsha Linehan (quoted in Carey, 2011) 
 
Marsha was a bright but challenging adolescent. After an agonizing stay at a residential 
mental health facility where she felt “out of control” and “totally empty,” and tried on several 
occasions to end her own life, she returned home with no hope for treatment. As young adult, 
however, she was determined to improve mental healthcare for individuals with difficult 
conditions. Marsha Linehan received a PhD in clinical psychology and went on to develop 
dialectical behavioral therapy – an approach designed to treat individuals with persistent 
suicidality. Linehan’s approach has been empirically validated and successful in treating a 
number of disorders, especially borderline personality disorder (Lieb et al., 2004).  
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a chronic mental illness affecting social, 
emotional, and cognitive functioning as well as the stability of one’s identity (APA, 2013). 
Linehan herself suffered from BPD but managed to recover using the techniques in her own 
therapy (Carey, 2011). She knows she will never be fully free of BPD but finds that her 
symptoms are much more manageable then when she was a teenager, desperately banging her 
head against the wall in the inpatient facility in a despondent attempt to end her life. 
 Many individuals with BPD have stories that start like Linehan’s without the happy 
ending. Approximately 3-9% of individuals with BPD die by suicide, compared to 2-4% of 
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individuals with affective disorders like bipolar or major depression (Stanley and New, 2018; 
Bostwick and Pankratz, 2000). Given the global and persistent impairments, BPD is considered 
one of the most challenging disorders to treat. With this challenge comes stigma: mental health 
care providers often view individuals with BPD as “manipulative,” “demanding,” and “attention-
seeking” (Aviram, Brodsky, and Stanley, 2006). Therapists often express hesitancy about 
working with this population and are reluctant to engage emotionally with BPD clients, which 
can lead to difficulties in finding adequate treatment (Bourke and Grenyer, 2010). 
 Given that many individuals experience symptoms like those described by Dr. Linehan, it 
seems likely that individuals who suffer from BPD experience morally-relevant impairments that 
could impair their capacity for moral agency. Even though many patients who receive treatment 
achieve remission without relapse or suicide (approximately 65%), many continue to experience 
severe symptoms (Lieb et al., 2004; Paris and Zweig-Frank, 2001) that could impair moral 
responsibility. I will not discuss the moral responsibility of individuals experiencing severe BPD 
symptoms though reflection these individuals can contribute much to the broader philosophical 
discussion. I have chosen to focus on individuals like Marsha Linehan who recover from BPD 
and successfully manage their symptoms because they pose a specific problem for virtue ethics. 
Individuals who recover from BPD still experience some residual, sub-clinical symptoms that 
interfere with moral behavior. Despite this interference, it is reasonable to suppose that these 
some of these individuals behave morally at the same rate as any other moral agents (cf. Zanarini 
et al., 2012). Additionally, I suggest that individuals that recover from BPD (and others like 
them) are distinct from other moral agents and warrant a different designation: moral 
superheroes.  
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 I also argue in order to give moral superheroes the praise they deserve we must rethink 
the relationship between continence, temperance, and virtue. Many versions of virtue theory 
claim that temperance is more virtuous than continence. Aristotelian virtue theory takes it a step 
further – temperance is virtuous while continence is merely praiseworthy (commendable moral 
effort that aims at virtue) and not virtuous. The temperate person is not tempted by other 
considerations when acting morally while the continent person falls short of virtue because she is 
tempted by other considerations when acting in line with virtue. Moral superheroes act morally 
but do so while plagued by thoughts and impulses that can distract from moral behavior). It is the 
nature of a chronic and pervasive condition like borderline personality disorder to impose 
constant pressure to immoral behavior. We praise the efforts of moral superheroes because their 
continence is moral and aims at virtue while falling short achieving virtue itself. 
 I dispute this account of virtue and suggest that continence can be virtuous and more 
praiseworthy than temperance under a specific set of circumstances, namely, the kinds of 
circumstances that produce moral superheroes. I argue that a virtue theory that properly praises 
moral superheroes will be more inclusive than a theory that insists that silencing-like temperance 
is required for virtue.  
4.2 Clinical Profile 
Personality disorders in general should be understood as pervasive and enduring – 
starting at early adulthood (and likely childhood), affecting multiple areas of functioning 
(cognition, emotional, social, etc.), and often persisting throughout the lifespan (APA, 2013). 
Individuals with antisocial personality disorder, for example, must show evidence of conduct 
disorder (characterized by aberrant and often violent behavior) in childhood and present with 
deficits in interpersonal emotional functioning (they fail to form caring attachments with others) 
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in adulthood (APA, 2013). In BPD, studies suggest a more complex developmental profile that 
nonetheless shows patterns of dysfunction starting in early childhood and residual symptoms that 
persist despite treatment (Carlson, Egeland, and Sroufe, 2009; Zanarini et al., 2005; Dutton & 
Golant, 1995). 
To meet diagnostic criteria for borderline personality disorder, an individual must meet 
five or more of the following symptoms:  1. Demonstrates strong fear of abandonment (e.g. not wanting their partner to get a 
promotion at work because it could eventually lead to a transfer) 2. Provokes volatile relationships; oscillates between love and loathing the other 
(“idealization and devaluation” (APA, 2013)) 3. Maintains no secure sense of self (e.g. someone who changes careers frequently, 
despite being happy at his job and performing well, no clear sense of goals or values) 4. Exhibits poor impulse control in areas that are harmful to themselves, e.g. reckless 
spending, drug use, high-risk sex;  5. Demonstrates “recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating 
behavior,” (APA, 2013)  6. Displays mood instability (e.g. individual is often irritable or anxious for brief periods 
of time) 7. Perceives “chronic feelings of emptiness” (APA, 2013) 8. Presents difficulties regulating anger (e.g. individual might have frequent outbursts or 
regularly get into physical fights)  
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9. Experiences “transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative 
symptoms,” (often in response to real or perceived abandonment) (APA, 2013)21 
It is important to note that while not all the individuals with BPD may experience the 
suicidal/self-injury symptom at any given point in time, 87% of individuals with BPD report 
attempting suicide at some point in lives with an average of 3.4 attempts (Andover, Schatten, & 
Morris, 2018). For instructive comparison – 15% of individuals with major depression and 29% 
of individuals with bipolar disorder report attempting suicide at some point in their lives 
(Oquendo, Currier, & Mann, 2006). On a broader scale, two studies found that 40-60% of 
adolescents and young adults who died by suicide meet criteria for a personality disorder and 
borderline was diagnosed in 17-50% of that subset (Linehan et al., 2002). In other words, one of 
the key features of BPD is suicidality.  
 BPD occurs in 1-2% of the population (Stanley & Singh, 2018), with women making up 
75% of those diagnosed (APA, 2013).22 Studies have also found that individuals with BPD are 
more likely to have chronic health problems like obesity (and related syndromes like diabetes), 
fibromyalgia, and back pain that require medical treatment and hospitalization than individuals 
who have recovered from BPD(Zanarini and Conkey, 2018). These medical conditions impose 
an additional burden on the individual with borderline and often shorten their lifespan. 
                                                
21 In addition to these symptoms, individuals with BPD are also diagnosed with mood disorders (e.g. depression, 
bipolar, etc.), substance use disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder, eating disorders, ADHD, and other personality 
disorders (APA, 2013). Comorbid diagnosis with bipolar disorder occurs in 10-25% of individuals with BPD or 
bipolar (Gunderson et al., 2006). Though BPD and bipolar are not causally related, clinicians must be mindful of the 
symptomatic similarities when making diagnoses. For example, an impulsive spending spree characteristic of BPD 
could be mistaken for a manic or hypomanic episode. 
22 This gender difference is not without controversy – Grant and colleagues (2008) found equal rates in the general 
population using a nationwide (United States) epidemiological survey. Becker and Lamb (1994) assigned male and 
female designations to identical cases distributed to mental health professionals and found that the female cases 
were given more diagnoses of BPD than the male cases (F(1, 283) = 5.22, p<.05). Nearly all individuals diagnosed 
with BPD report abuse and/or neglect in childhood (90% and 90%, respectively), with the severity of the abuse 
correlating with the severity of the symptoms (Zanarini and Conkey, 2018).  
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 Though the myriad symptoms and comorbid conditions paints a heterogeneous disorder, 
every individual with BPD suffers severe, pervasive impairments. Most experienced childhood 
abuse and/or neglect and will, at some point over the course of their battle with the disorder, 
attempt to take their own life. Unlike individuals with antisocial personality disorder, who fail to 
form caring attachments due to emotional disinterest, those with BPD long for emotional 
intimacy while simultaneously behaving in ways that discourage such attachments.  
This dichotomy results from the medley of symptoms best depicted by clinical case 
studies. Katz and Cox (2002) give a rich account of 16-year-old “Diane” (name changed for 
privacy) who was admitted to an inpatient facility for BPD. She was admitted after her third 
attempted overdose and had a history of frequent self-harm. In this instance she tried to end her 
life after a fight with her sister. When she arrived she met with a new doctor on a different ward 
and did not want to work with this psychiatrist. Her conversation with the physician, “f--- you, I 
want to see Dr. Smith…If that’s the case, then I won’t talk to anybody, I'm fine now…” (quoted 
in Katz and Cox, 2002, p. 87), demonstrated dysregulated anger, poor impulse control, and a fear 
of abandonment. The following day she did not attend the scheduled discharge meeting but 
stayed in bed crying (fluctuations in mood). Eventually she was convinced to work with the new 
psychiatrist and stay for treatment. She did try to strangle herself once when her psychiatrist was 
gone for two days (fear of abandonment, emotion dysregulation) but overall had an effective 
treatment experience. 
We can infer that Diane’s emotional dysregulation, mood fluctuations, and fear of 
abandonment cause relational difficulties outside of the clinic. This is further supported by the 
cause of her admission: a fight with her sister that led to a suicide attempt. While she faced 
circumstances that left her feeling emotionally vulnerable inside the facility, she also interacted 
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with individuals who were skilled at interpersonal interactions. In other words: Diane’s symptom 
presentation likely mirrors how she behaves at home. Suicidal and self-harming behaviors also 
tend to interfere with moral functioning.  
Case studies give us an idea of moral functioning in BPD but do not paint the full picture. 
While some disorders like psychopathy (a subset of antisocial personality disorder) seem 
downright amoral with symptoms like “callous/lack of empathy” and “lack of remorse or guilt” 
(Hare et al, 1990, p. 339), the moral implications of BPD are not obvious. The moral 
consequences of BPD often extend beyond interpersonal impotence and the downstream effects 
of suicidality and self-harm. 
Individuals with BPD are more likely to violate interpersonal and community moral 
standards. Interpersonally, mothers with BPD are more likely to display unhealthy to emotionally 
abusive parenting styles, shifting from being over-involved and demanding one day to distant 
and disinterested the next (Stepp et al., 2011). Dutton (2006) found that men who abuse their 
wives often have BPD traits or met criteria for BPD.23 These men oscillate between “the love of 
my life” and “I hate that b----” and demonstrate an intense fear of abandonment. One man was at 
office party with his wife and could not find her for a few minutes. When he found her, he 
insisted that they leave the party. Later that night he pulled out of the bed and beat her 
unconscious, breaking her nose, two teeth and bruising her ribs. When asked why he attacked 
her, he said that he thought she disappeared at the party to have sex with another man (she was 
socializing outside with female coworkers) (Dutton, 1995). 
In the community, individuals with BPD are more likely to engage in reckless driving 
behaviors, receiving more moving and nonmoving violations than individuals without BPD 
                                                
23 This result is surprising given that we might be inclined to think abusers would be more likely to have antisocial 
or narcissistic personality disorder but Dutton’s thorough research consistently finds that BPD is the most common 
among this group. 
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(Sansone, Lam, and Wiederman, 2010). Many of these offenses result in time behind bars. 
Sansone and Sansone (2009) argue that BPD is overrepresented in prison populations. One study 
found that nearly 30% of a random sampling of individuals in one facility met clinical criteria for 
the disorder, compared to 1-2% of the general adult population  (Black et al., 200724; Stanley & 
Singh, 2018). These individuals were serving time for offenses such as “drug 
manufacturing/delivery,” “assault/abuse,”  “burglary,” and “DUI/driving while barred” (Black et 
al., 2007, p. 401).25 
4.3  Recovery and Moral Functioning 
Recall from the introduction that Dr. Marsha Linehan, a leading scholar and clinician in 
BPD research, was hospitalized with borderline personality disorder as an adolescent and young 
adult. After failed treatments and suicide attempts, Dr. Linehan was able to manage her 
symptoms, earn a PhD, and create an empirically supported treatment program. Of course not 
every BPD success story need be as monumental as Linehan’s – individuals who survive the 
disorder might enter healthy relationships, pursue meaningful careers, or simply feel their lives 
are worth living – and this is more than enough. Recall that these individuals do experience 
substantial symptom recurrence but are able to manage via medication, therapy, and coping 
strategies. They are still predisposed to heightened emotional responses, for example, but are 
able to catch these feelings before they translate into impulsive actions. Despite the effort it takes 
to manage the residual symptoms, individuals like Linehan act morally: they stand up to 
injustice, they donate to charity, they fulfill their duties to their communities, etc. 
                                                
24 It is also worth noting that the most common disorder in Black and colleague’s (2007) prison sample was 
substance use disorder, affecting approximately 95% of individuals with BPD and 91% of individuals who did not 
meet criteria for BPD. 
25 Of the individuals diagnosed with BPD, 38.5% were imprisoned for “drug manufacturing/delivery,” 24% for 
“assault/abuse,” 12.3% for  “burglary,” and 7.7% for “DUI/driving while barred” (Black et al., 2007, p. 401). 
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Let’s examine a fictional example: an individual who has recovered from BPD, “Omar,” 
and a typical moral agent, “Juan,” both feel the temptation to rear-end the car in front of them 
when they are cut off in traffic but the temptation is intensified for Omar by his predisposition 
towards anger (residual BPD symptom). Both Omar and Juan keep their calm and drive a safe 
distance, resisting the immoral action. The resulting action is the same but it seems that Omar did 
more to act morally. Juan felt a moderate degree of anger at the driver for cutting him off. Juan 
easily overcame this moderate degree of anger in order to drive safely and act morally. Omar, on 
the other hand, is predisposed to feel disproportionate anger due to borderline personality 
disorder. When he is cut off in traffic he feels a strong sense of anger boiling in his chest. 
Fortunately he has learned to manage his symptoms and through deep breathing, calm self-talk, 
and other strategies he manages to overcome his anger and drive safely.  
Omar spent years developing these coping and emotion regulation strategies. He 
expended tremendous effort before this moment in order to manage his anger in this moment. 
Furthermore, Omar expended more effort in the moment due to his predisposition towards anger. 
His extra effort in the moment and long-term mean that Omar does much more than the typical 
moral agent to produce the same moral behavior. It seems both inadequate and inaccurate to say 
that Omar and Juan should receive the same amount of praise. 
We might compare this to climbing Mount Everest. Approximately 150 people have 
reached the top of Everest but only one man, Erik Weihenmayer, has summited the mountain 
while completely visually impaired (Angley, 2016). There is something admirable about anyone 
climbing to the top of Everest – navigating the multi-day journey, scaling the compacted ice near 
the top, and surviving the thin air at the infamous 26,000+ feet “death zone” – but there is 
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something especially admirable about doing it all without sight.26 Similarly, it is praiseworthy for 
an agent to act morally but it is especially praiseworthy for someone who has recovered from 
BPD to act morally. Just as it requires more effort for someone without sight to climb a 
mountain, it requires more effort for someone who has recovered from BPD to act morally. 
Individuals recovering from BPD face obstacles at each turn when attempting to act morally. 
Their residual symptoms make it more difficult to get out of bed (the base of the mountain), 
manage complicated interpersonal interactions (working with teammates), regulate emotions 
(navigate ice climbing), etc.  
While it took more effort for Omar to regulate his anger while driving and more effort for 
Weihenmayer while climbing Everest, these men also worked harder to prepare for these events. 
When discussing effort we find praiseworthy it is helpful to distinguish between two types of 
effort: developmental and momentary. In the moral realm, developmental effort involves 
cultivating virtue or shaping one’s psychology in such a way that you will be more disposed to 
act morally in a given moment. Someone in recovery from BPD (like Omar) can spend years 
learning how to regulate their emotions and manage difficult interpersonal situations. They may 
attend weekly groups, participate in ongoing individual therapy, have had experiences with 
inpatient treatment and/or medications. This effort helps them enter recovery. Once in recovery 
they must continue to practice these skills in order to behave morally. All of this effort amounts 
to the developmental effort required for someone in recovery from BPD to behave morally. As I 
mentioned in the driving example, it is more effortful for someone with borderline to behave 
morally in the moment. I call this momentary effort. When Omar acts morally on the interstate 
he is expending more momentary effort that is a result of more developmental effort than Juan in 
                                                
26 Nepal has recently banned the severely visually impaired, double amputees, and solo climbers from Everest 
(Pasha-Robinson, 2017). 
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order to produce the same moral action. Omar is more praiseworthy than Juan on both fronts, but 
is this enough? 
4.4 Moral Superheroes 
Individuals who recover from BPD face sufficient challenges and are praiseworthy 
enough to warrant a new category: moral superheroes. Moral superheroes possess morally-
relevant dispositions that set them apart from other moral agents. Unlike moral exemplars that 
provide examples to inspire the efforts of typical moral agents (Zagzebski, 2017; Blum, 1994), 
moral superheroes experience morally-relevant challenges that other moral agents do not face. 
These differences make it more difficult for the moral superhero to cultivate virtue. 
Moral superheroes must first learn to live with significant differences in moral faculties 
then work towards moral excellence (developmental effort) while keeping whatever impulses or 
misdirection those faculties might generate at bay (momentary effort).27 In order to be a moral 
superhero an agent must: (1) possess marked, unchangeable morally-relevant difference(s) in 
moral faculties; (2) act morally at approximately the same rate or better than other moral agents; 
and (3) act morally for the right reasons (whatever the right reasons happen to be, given your 
normative theory). I include the third criteria to ensure that we do not end up with accidental 
moral superheroes (e.g. a woman who has morally-relevant differences in her moral faculties 
who acts morally at the same rate as other agents simply by chance – her behavior is completely 
random but just so happens to be moral enough to qualify) or supervillains masquerading as 
                                                
27 I envision that these qualities (morally-relevant differences in moral faculties) come from mental illnesses like 
BPD but there is nothing to stop these qualities coming from elsewhere, assuming that the individual meets the other 
criteria for being a moral superhero. 
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moral superheroes (e.g. a man who meets (1) and (2) but only acts morally in order gain support 
for his presidential campaign and ultimately start a nuclear war).28  
It is also important to note that morally relevant differences experienced by a moral 
superhero are unchangeable. I do not mean that we will never improve our treatment of BPD to 
the point where the morally relevant differences disappear, only that the current science of 
treatment supports the idea that residual symptoms remain in even the most vigilant patients. 
These criteria is meant to exclude individuals who possess morally relevant differences that be 
eradicated without concerted effort such as therapy, exposures to additional viewpoints, maturity, 
etc. I do not consider children (even ones who act morally) moral superheroes. Someone who 
acts morally while nursing a cold would also not count as a moral superhero because such 
conditions are cured after a few weeks of rest and rehydration.29 Moral superheroes, on the 
contrary, face lifelong challenges. Their symptoms may be better or worse at times but their 
condition is ongoing – no amount of time or treatment will cure the underlying cause of the 
morally relevant differences. 
In this section I suggested that individuals like Dr. Linehan – individuals who have 
recovered from borderline personality disorder and lead morally functional lives – are substantial 
enough to warrant a new category: moral superheroes. Moral superheroes are distinct from moral 
exemplars in that they have morally-relevant differences that can impair their moral functioning.  
                                                
28 Some readers may find (3) repetitive. If an individual’s action has been deemed moral presumably the reason 
behind this action was already investigated. This is not the case for every normative theory and (3) imposes a “right 
reasons” check on normative theories that do not have a “right reasons” account built in. 
29 In BPD, many individuals find that emotional symptoms can make social interactions more volatile (impede moral 
functioning) but often make an individual with BPD more sensitive to the needs of others (enhance moral 
functioning) (for a review see Dinsdale and Crespi, 2013). In the case of individuals who have recovered from BPD, 
they are able to manage their symptoms that cause impediments to moral functioning (as well as those that do not) 
and are thought to maintain the benefits like heightened sensitivity to the needs of others. 
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Unlike moral exemplars tend to act morally more often than the typical moral agent (Zagzebski, 
2017), moral superheroes (particularly in the case of BPD) act morally at approximately the 
same rate as other moral agents but fight an internal battle to overcome morally-relevant 
impairments. The efforts of moral superheroes may be less visible than most agents but that does 
not make them any less praiseworthy. 
4.5 Implications for Virtue Ethics 
Individuals who recover from BPD work much harder than typical moral agents to 
produce the same behavioral outcomes. They expend more effort in the moment but also spend 
years in treatment learning how to manage their symptoms. I have argued that this extra effort 
warrants the designation of moral superheroes. What are the consequences of identifying this 
new class of moral agents? As I mentioned in the introduction, the existence of moral 
superheroes has consequences for discussions of temperance and continence in virtue ethics. 
Aristotle discusses continence, incontinence, and temperance at length in Book VII of the Ethics, 
and argues that while it is admirable that the continent person is tempted by immoral pursuits but 
overcomes the temptation, the temperate person is not tempted by immoral actions (1151b35-
1152a2). In the contemporary tradition, McDowell (1978) argues that the virtuous person is not 
tempted by immoral action; these options are “silenced” and the virtuous person acts morally 
without any second thoughts (p. 28).30  
 4.5.1 Aristotelian Temperance and Silencing 
Aristotle argues that while continence is “good and praiseworthy” (1145b8), only 
temperance counts as virtuous. He states that while the continent person is tempted by (but does 
not act upon) “base” desires, the temperate person is completely free from such desires 
                                                
30 Some may note that Kantian ethics could weigh in on this issue as well. In this essay I have chosen to focus on 
Aristotle and will take up discussions of Kant elsewhere. 
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(1146a12; 1152a1-2; cf. Roberts, 1989). We become temperate through habituation and by 
cultivating our desires such that they align with what is moral and rational.  
John McDowell (1978) provides an account of temperance in which all non-virtuous 
considerations are “silenced” in the mind of a virtuous person (p. 26). The virtuous person 
perceives the situation differently than the continent person and does not consider “reasons for 
acting otherwise” (McDowell, 1979, p. 26). While the continent person may see danger and be 
unsettled by fear or the deceived hope that someone else will save the drowning child, the 
virtuous person will be clear-headed in her decision to jump in the water. The continent person 
may ultimately decide to do the virtuous action (she may even do it as quickly as the virtuous 
person) but she is nonetheless affected by non-virtuous considerations and cannot be considered 
temperate. The mind of the virtuous person, on other hand, is set solely on the virtuous task in 
front of her. She perceives the relevant dangers differently: she takes appropriate precautions 
before diving into the water (e.g. brings a spare flotation device, knows she is a good swimmer) 
because proper preparation is key to bravery as well (McDowell, 1979; Nicomachean Ethics 
1117a9-25).31 She does not experience feelings of fear or temptations to act otherwise. 
The silencing account of temperance is a tall order.32 Not only must we act as morality 
demands without being truly tempted by non-virtuous considerations, we cannot even think 
about these considerations when virtue calls. We must perceive, think, and act morally in order 
to be virtuous. Let’s say that I am excited about attending my best friend’s wedding. Just as I am 
                                                
31 To jump into the waters too quickly and without proper considerations would be brash rather than brave, the 
opposite extreme of cowardice on Aristotle’s view of courage as a virtue of the mean. The well-prepared person who 
does not act is not courageous either. 
32 McDowell grants that the virtuous individual will be tempted by non-virtuous considerations outside of morally-
demanding situations: “In the absence of a requirement, the prospective enjoyment would constitute a reason for 
going ahead” (1978, p. 27). In a non-moral context the virtuous person could relax on the beach instead of diving 
into treacherous waters, enjoy a fancy dinner rather than rush into a burning building, or accelerate 0-100 on a 
controlled racing experience track with proper safety gear.  
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about to leave my partner cries out in pain, clutching their side. My partner is experiencing a 
sharp, agonizing pain in their right side. It is clear that they need immediate medical attention. I 
do not hesitate – I drive my partner to the nearest medical facility and accompany them 
throughout their care. Most of my mind is consumed by worry and fear for my partner’s well-
being as well as practical concerns such as choosing the right facility and managing insurance. 
There was, however, a flicker of sadness the moment I realized we would not be attending the 
wedding. I might even have moments once my partner is under stable care where I think 
longingly of the ceremony and the speech I had planned for the reception. This is not to say that I 
regret taking care of my partner, only that the wedding is not completely removed from my 
mind. I recognize that morality (in conjunction with the demands of my relationship and love for 
my partner33) demands that I forgo the wedding to take care of my ailing partner and I act 
accordingly. On the silencing view, my action was not virtuous because I still had thoughts of the 
wedding: my sacrifice was not complete. My continence (I took care of my partner despite 
thoughts of the wedding) is praiseworthy but falls short of virtue. If I managed to remove all 
thoughts of the wedding from my mind as soon as I realized my partner was seriously ill I would 
be more praiseworthy and likely considered virtuous on the silencing view. Although the 
silencing view sets a high bar for virtue we can see the intuitive appeal in this example: imagine 
my partner found out that I was having fleeting thoughts of the wedding while they were in 
agonizing pain. They would still be grateful that I came to their aid but my longing (however 
brief) to be elsewhere does seem to detract from the moral worth of my actions.  
The silencing view also implies that the temperate person must have their mental 
faculties in order: they (unconsciously) regulate their emotions in stressful situations, they 
                                                
33 See Railton (1984), “Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality.” 
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overcame their fears, and they are interpersonally effective. The virtuous person cannot have 
ongoing symptoms of mental illness. Connecting the silencing view with BPD and the discussion 
in the previous section, moral superheroes are continent but not virtuous. Moral superheroes 
override temptations to act morally and this is the best they can do. They cannot fully extinguish 
their impulses; rather, they expend additional effort daily to overcome temptation and act 
morally. The moral agent who has never experienced BPD and acts without inclination to do 
otherwise expends less effort but is considered more praiseworthy than the moral superhero on 
the silencing view. Moreover, the moral agent whose inclinations to act contrary to the demands 
of morality are silenced can be considered virtuous on the silencing view while the moral 
superhero (who, again, expends more effort for the same moral behavior) cannot. 
Perhaps my interpretations of Aristotle and the requirements of silencing have been too 
limited. We might adopt a more generous understanding of what is required to act with 
Aristotelian virtue: virtuous actors do not need to fully silence competing inclinations, they just 
cannot take them seriously. I can have brief, wistful moments where I think about my best 
friend’s wedding while attending to the needs of my ailing partner as long as I do not seriously 
entertain the option of leaving the hospital. I am sad about the wedding but the decision does not 
weigh on me or cause me intrapersonal turmoil and this is what separates me from the merely 
continent agent. This interpretation of Aristotle allows agents to encounter non-moral 
considerations while also maintaining a sense of internal harmony while acting virtuously. 
Unfortunately moral superheroes are still not virtuous on this interpretation of 
Aristotelian virtue. The non-moral considerations encountered by moral superheroes are stronger 
than fleeting thoughts that can be dismissed with minimal effort by most virtuous agents. Moral 
superheroes, particularly, individuals in recovery from BPD, experience certain non-moral 
 
 
84 
considerations as compelling alternatives to moral action. In the wedding case, the thought of 
leaving my partner alone at the hospital does not actually cross my mind – I am merely 
momentarily saddened at missing this important event. In the driving case, the thought of rear-
ending the car that cut him off does cross Omar’s mind and presents as an actionable alternative 
to regulating his anger and driving calmly (acting morally). Omar consistently rejects the former 
in favor of the latter but we can see how in the case of moral superheroes, competing inclinations 
offer a genuine challenge to moral action. It is not accurate to say that moral superheroes 
experience internal conflict when acting morally – Omar does not waffle between aggression and 
safe driving – but it is also inaccurate to suggest that the discordant impulses that arise from 
conditions like BPD can constitute Aristotelian intrapersonal harmony. Even with a more 
generous understanding of silencing and Aristotelian virtue theory it seems that moral 
superheroes still fail to be virtuous. 
Proponents of Aristotelian virtue might respond by saying that moral superheroes are 
particularly praiseworthy continent individuals since they are tempted by especially strong 
desires. Support for this claim can be found in the Ethics: “If…the appetites are weak and not 
base, continence is nothing impressive” (1146a15-16). If Omar resists a fleeting desire to change 
the channel from one baseball game to another when watching television with Juan, no one 
would find his continence praiseworthy. If, on the other hand, Omar resists the strong impulse to 
physically attack Juan for accidentally totaling his car a second time, then his continence is very 
praiseworthy. Proponents of the silencing view would maintain, however, that a temperate 
person is nevertheless more praiseworthy than any continent person, no matter how difficult the 
temptation the continent person overcomes. 
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We might see the variations in praiseworthiness amongst continence as supporting the 
moral superhero theory. On this view, moral superheroes experience more intense temptations 
than continent individuals without BPD (or other qualifying conditions). The actions of moral 
superheroes would likely be the most praiseworthy of all continent individuals.  
But is this good enough? As I mentioned, may approaches that classify temperance as 
virtuous typically classify anything below temperance as non-virtuous, no matter how 
praiseworthy. Moral superheroes may be the most praiseworthy of all continent individuals but 
they are not virtuous, according to the silencing view. However, many moral superheroes seem 
more virtuous than the average virtuous person. Take Marsha Linehan: in the moment, she 
overcomes her fear of crowded spaces each day to drive to work and do research that helps a 
marginalized population (Carey, 2011). Over time she cultivated the emotional stability to be 
vulnerable with clients and in group settings, risking her own mood fluctuations. She raised a 
well-adjusted daughter while continuing her career and developing the first empirically validated 
treatment for BPD. She acted morally while constantly regulating her emotions, actively using 
mindfulness and other support skills, forcing herself to get out of bed, and so on. On the 
silencing view (and other views that endorse a similar definition of temperance), however, the 
extraordinary effort she goes through each day to act morally makes her simultaneously more 
praiseworthy than the average continent agent and unable to achieve virtue. It looks like the 
same factors that make her more praiseworthy also make her unable to achieve virtue. This 
appearance is puzzling. 
Recall that according to the silencing account the virtuous, temperate person does not 
overcome mental obstacles in the moment in order to act virtuously. She does not consciously 
regulate her emotions because she did enough regulation in her past that now she feels the right 
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things in the right amount automatically. The virtuous agent became virtuous through practice – 
she repeatedly acted courageously in daunting situations, she chose over and over again to give 
generously to those in need, etc. She habituated her emotions, overcame her fears and 
vulnerabilities, and treated any underlying conditions so that when morality called she could 
answer without a second thought. Linehan might appear to be working harder but the virtuous 
person put in the hard work earlier in the process. If Linehan keeps working, one day she can be 
virtuous. 
Unfortunately this is not the case. BPD is a chronic and pervasive condition. Those who 
recover to become moral superheroes deal with residual, sub-clinical symptoms that affect their 
daily functioning. Individuals like Linehan go through years of treatment and deliberate effort in 
order to recover from BPD. This background effort is at least as difficult if not greater than the 
background effort put forth by a temperate agent. When the temperate person goes to act morally 
the action requires no mental strain, according to the silencing view. When the moral superhero 
goes to act morally they must put forth effort in the moment in addition to their past effort in 
recovering from their condition. Individuals in recovery manage their symptoms but their battle 
to manage BPD can never be fully silenced. Barring some revolution in psychopharmacology, 
managing symptoms is the best possible outcome for BPD (and many other psychiatric 
conditions). Moral superheroes cannot be temperate if we understanding temperance through the 
silencing view. On this account the virtue of temperance is also inaccessible to many people with 
mental illness who manage similarly intrusive conditions. 
Furthermore, some virtue theorists ascribe to Aristotle’s theory of the unity of the virtues. 
This idea claims that in order to be truly virtuous one must cultivate all of virtues – one cannot 
be truly courageous without being temperate, truly charitable without being courageous, etc. 
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(MacIntyre, 1981). Many authors find the unity of the virtues counterintuitive (e.g. Flanagan, 
1991), others are nonetheless committed to the view. Moral superheroes introduce another 
criticism of the unity of the virtues: if moral superheroes cannot be temperate then they can never 
be courageous, charitable, just, etc. I have argued that it seems implausible to praise virtuous 
agents more than continent agents in the case of superheroes but it seems even more implausible 
to suggest that moral superheroes are barred from courage when acting bravely and charity when 
acting generous as well. I chose to focus on temperance and continence in this essay but the 
consequences of this debate spread to all other virtues according to the unity of the virtues thesis. 
 4.5.2 Fork in the Road 
Moral superheroes bring up two related problems for virtue theory: (1) moral superheroes 
seem at least as praiseworthy and likely more praiseworthy than your average virtuous person, 
they are continent are thereby viewed as less praiseworthy than temperate agents on most views; 
(2) despite their intuitive moral agency and good deeds, moral superheroes can never be virtuous 
on many accounts of virtue theory. One solution is simple but will require some explanation: 
accept both (1) and (2) and acknowledge that while this outcome is not ideal, it does not affect 
the majority of moral agents. On this view we ought to treat moral superheroes as outliers in a 
data set – better to acknowledge that they are different but exclude them from our overall 
explanation to avoid skewing the rest of the data. The other solution (the solution I favor) 
involves rejecting the silencing account in favor of a pluralist view on what it means to act 
virtuously.34 
 The simplest solution is to accept the consequences of (1) and (2) and maintain that moral 
superheroes are not virtuous. As I mentioned in the introduction, borderline personality disorder 
                                                
34 There is also a third solution: we could reject the unity of the virtues. If we reject the unity of the virtues we throw 
out a major tenant of Aristotelian virtue theory. Moreover, we do not resolve all problems for the silencing view 
since moral superheroes cannot be temperate. 
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affects 1-2% of the adult population.35 I suspect that other mental illnesses or conditions will 
meet criteria for moral superheroes but I have not explored that idea in this essay. That being 
said, it is highly likely that we are talking about close to 5% of the adult population for a low 
estimate. It is one thing to say many people do not make the effort towards virtue but another to 
say they cannot work towards it. If we stick to our guns with the silencing we are effectively 
saying that at least 1/20 of the moral community cannot be temperate and (according to the unity 
of the virtues) can never be virtuous. The criticism of the silencing view has gone from making 
temperance difficult for everyone (recall the discussion of the silencing view) to impossible for 
certain groups. If we accept the unity of the virtues, not achieving temperance means that moral 
superheroes cannot be virtuous.36 
 I reject the simple solution, and offer a more compelling alternative: a pluralistic account 
of virtue. The pluralistic account accommodates moral superheroes as well as agents who are 
able to pursue Aristotelian virtue via silencing or similar accounts. My view solves problems (1) 
and (2) while preserving the value traditional virtue ethics: individuals can pursue virtue through 
traditional silencing and silencing-like routes and moral superheroes can also pursue virtue 
through continence (as described earlier in this essay). The existence of moral superheroes 
suggests that virtue is not one size fits all. The silencing view implies that a virtuous agent 
cannot experience dispositions to act otherwise when acting morally. I accept that this is one path 
to virtue but unlike proponents of the silencing view, I do not believe this is the only way to be 
virtuous. Moral superheroes demonstrate that some individuals who experience dispositions to 
act otherwise when acting morally can be virtuous, despite failing to meet the requirements of 
                                                
35 I acknowledge that not all individuals with BPD will recover but I take an optimistic stance that all individuals 
have the potential to recover and qualify for moral superhero status. 
36 According to the unity of the virtues you must cultivate all of the virtues to be virtuous. You cannot be truly 
virtuous if you are temperate but not brave, for example. 
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the silencing view. My view is supported by other accounts of virtue, including Foot’s (2002) 
corrective view. 
Foot (2002) offers a corrective understanding of virtue that may be compatible with the 
moral superhero account by removing some of the cognitive component of temperance. By 
placing less emphasis on every thought in an agent’s head we maintain many of the important 
demands of virtue while avoiding unnecessary demands. She also acknowledges that not all 
behavioral hesitation is made equal. 
 Foot (2002) thinks that the amount of virtue expressed in instances of hesitation (apparent 
incontinence) depends on the particular virtue and if the circumstances truly challenge the virtue. 
If a witness feels some fear when testifying against someone who tried to take her life, this seems 
appropriate. The virtue in this scenario is courage and the circumstances seem to truly challenge 
courage. If the witness feels fear she is not being incontinent – she genuinely has something to 
fear in this scenario. Her fear is appropriate for the situation and by testifying despite her fear she 
acts morally. If, on the other hand, a man is tempted to stay home and play video games rather 
than visit his terminally ill friend in the hospital, this seems inappropriate. In the second scenario 
the virtue is charity and the circumstance do not seem truly challenging. The man is incontinent 
rather than genuinely challenged by some competing circumstances. 
 On one interpretation moral superheroes struggle to act morally because they are 
continent (and thereby less praiseworthy) the way Foot describes: they are tempted by non-moral 
considerations. Returning to BPD, we might think of another case with Omar and Juan. The two 
friends have had plans for weeks to attend a baseball game. Juan calls at the last minute and asks 
to reschedule, apologizing and claiming that he is accidentally hungover. Charity demands that 
Omar reschedule when he is available but Omar is tempted to tell him that he is unavailable. His 
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impulse is driven by fear of abandonment and poor emotion regulation (symptoms of BPD). 
Despite the temptation to lie to his friend, Omar acts morally: he asks if Juan wants company 
while he recovers and says he is willing to reschedule.  
 We can understand the moral superhero’s incontinence to increase the virtue of the action 
because the moral superhero has not cultivated her mere continence, rather, her continence (and 
accompanying inclinations to act otherwise) is something that has happened to her by way of her 
disorder.37 Moreover, the moral superhero has worked to cultivate virtue as evidenced by her 
ability to behave morally at the same rate as any other moral agent (stipulated in the second 
requirement for being a moral superhero).38, 39 
The temptation to act otherwise in the case of individuals in recovery from BPD (and 
other moral superheroes) is intense but it is not the product of vice or mere incontinence. Foot’s 
(2002) supports the idea that overcoming this interference to act morally is praiseworthy and 
virtuous. By adopting pluralism we reject the interpretation that silencing is the only route to 
virtue. 40 I maintain that many instances and agents will find silencing an appropriate path to 
                                                
37 Again, I am open to instances where someone meets the qualifications for being a moral superhero without having 
mental illness.  
38 Foot’s (2002) arguments are further supported by Carr (2009). 
39 If we follow the implications of Foot’s view we might have concerns about individuals who are not quite moral 
superheroes but are working toward this designation. Behaviorally, the young aspiring moral superhero suffering 
from borderline personality disorder and the incontinent young adult may look remarkably similar. Someone early in 
treatment for BPD may not know that avoiding social interactions and moral responsibilities that make them feel 
uncomfortable will only make it more difficult to rise up to the occasion (and act virtuously) in the future. Similarly, 
the incontinent young adult avoids situations that call for virtue and then struggles to act when the call to be virtuous 
arrives on her doorstep. Despite the behavioral similarities there are two key differences: (1) the aspiring moral 
superhero’s incontinence comes from her illness while incontinent young adult chooses incontinence under the 
influence of her own desires and preferences rather than external forces; (2) the aspiring moral superhero is in 
treatment for BPD and is, through this process, removing some of the barriers that prevent her from acting morally. 
Recall that not everyone (or even most people) with BPD becomes a moral superhero; only those who successfully 
manage their condition and act morally are eligible for the designation. 
40 Similarly, Foot’s approach can be applied to Kantian virtue theory. We can interpret Kant to favor a similar 
position about the cause of hesitation and find hesitation admirable if and only if the hesitation is caused by 
something that does not detract from the virtue of the action. While this is not the dominant interpretation of Kant, it 
is not inconsistent with all readings (see Baron, 2006). 
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virtue. Moral superheroes suggest that the path to virtue is pluralistic: some agents with certain 
dispositions act without silencing inclinations to do otherwise and this should be considered 
virtuous. 
4.6  Conclusion 
Borderline personality disorder is a chronic and pervasive condition that affects social, 
emotional, and moral functioning. I argued that individuals who have recovered from BPD and 
act morally should be considered moral superheroes. Moral superheroes, act morally at the same 
rate (or better) than typical moral agents despite morally-relevant impairments. I argued that 
moral superheroes do not fit standard interpretations of virtue theories – specifically, 
predominant the silencing interpretation of Aristotle’s virtue of temperance. These theories 
cannot properly acknowledge the mental effort moral superheroes expend daily in order to 
function as a productive member of the moral community. I offered Foot’s account as a way to 
preserve virtue theories without excluding a significant portion of the population from virtue. 
The silencing account is not compatible with this solution but I argued that it is worth adopting a 
pluralistic view of virtue to properly praise individuals like Dr. Marsha Linehan: 
 “During those first years in Seattle she felt suicidal while driving to work;  
even today, she can feel rushes of panic, most recently while driving through  
tunnels. She relied on therapists herself… ‘I’m a very happy person now,’ she  
said in an interview at her house near campus… ‘I still have ups and downs,  
of course, but I think no more than anyone else.’” (Carey, 2011 with quotes  
from Dr. Marsha Linehan). 
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Chapter 5: Empathy, Epistemic Impairment, and Moral 
Responsibility in Autism Spectrum Disorder 
 
5.1 Introduction 
I am pathologically over-sensitive to criticism, I fear that people are not going  
to be pleased with me. I am afraid that if I do the wrong thing or say the wrong  
thing I will undo all the progress I have made so far. It could happen as a result  
of doing something by accident. (Jack Dewey, quoted in Dewey, 1991, p. 202) 
 
I met Daniel when I was working as a research assistant in a lab studying diagnostic 
measures of autism spectrum disorders.41 His mother was completing the Autism Diagnostic 
Interview (ADI-R) with the lead psychologist and I was assigned to keep him company for a few 
hours. When I greeted him he said “hello” back without looking and continued to play on the 
computer. He appeared to be around fourteen years old, thinly built but not athletic, and 
uncertain of what to do with a college-aged woman in the room. His mother probably felt 
comfortable leaving him alone but our protocol was to leave none of the participants alone, 
especially since we were evaluating their level of functioning without consulting previous 
diagnoses for the sanctity of the study. He shot me nervous glances for the first fifteen minutes 
before asking: 
 “Do you like LEGOs?” 
 “Absolutely!” 
 He proceeded to show me YouTube videos of stop-motion LEGO reenactments of World 
War I battles. I happen to have a penchant for World War history and the level of detail in the 
videos themselves was captivating: my engagement in this shared activity was genuine. 
Nonetheless, Daniel stole glances from the screen to puzzle at my face, furrowing his brows each 
                                                
41 Name changed for privacy. 
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time. We talked at length about the perils of trench warfare, the foolhardy flamethrower, and the 
abyss of “No Man’s Land” – all illustrated in a sea of plastic yellow faces and bend-less joints. 
After the second half-hour video Daniel turned to me, crestfallen: “I know these are boring. We 
don’t have to watch anymore if you don’t want.” It was clear others had told him this before, but 
what seemed especially evident was that others had watched these videos with him and feigned 
interest. The impetus pulling him away from the screen to glance at my face was to try and 
discern if I was truly enjoying myself. 
 I assured him that my interest was genuine and that I was happy to keep watching these 
videos until his mom returned. His face relaxed as he selected another reenactment. He continued 
to glance at me, even when we were not discussing tanks that could drive over barbed wire, as if 
he wanted to make sure I was not losing interest. His concern did not feel selfish – like that of a 
young man who wanted to keep watching his favorite videos42. Instead, I felt like I was spending 
time with someone who cared about my interests and happiness. 
 After Daniel completed the full battery of psychological tests, I followed up with the 
research team to see if he met criteria for autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Daniel was diagnosed 
high-functioning autism spectrum disorder (HFASD, formerly Asperger’s Syndrome). ASD is 
chronic condition developed in early childhood that affects social, sensory, and (in some cases) 
cognitive functioning (APA, 2013). The severity of ASD varies according to the individual’s 
level of functioning across each domain. ASD is treatable through skill- and accommodation-
based interventions but is not curable.  As a young adult, Daniel had received some 
psychological services through his school and his community to hone his social and 
communication skills. 
                                                
42 He told me he could easily watch the videos at home as part of his attempt to discern whether or not I was truly 
enjoying them. 
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 If Daniel continues to practice social and communication skills he may be able to discern 
needs, wants, or interests as well as individuals who do not have ASD. Daniel may need to be 
more explicit – asking if someone is enjoying themselves (like he did with the videos) – and he 
may need to work harder – attending social skills groups with peers who also experience social 
impairments to learn strategies for interacting with others – but Daniel is capable of navigating 
the social terrain. More importantly, Daniel is capable of empathy. Despite persistent social 
impairments, individuals with HFASD are capable of empathy and should be held morally 
responsible for their actions. 
 First I will discuss the diagnostic criteria for ASD and clarify what distinguishes someone 
with HFASD from the rest of the heterogeneous spectrum. I then establish criteria for research 
on ASD and empathy and evaluate three studies that approximate these criteria. From these 
results I analyze how social impairments affect moral functioning. I argue that while social 
competency makes morality epistemically easier, keen social functioning is not necessary for 
moral functioning. 
5.2 Diagnostic Criteria 
To be diagnosed with autism an individual must exhibit three social deficits and two or more 
restrictive/repetitive symptoms. The three social symptoms are:  
(1) “deficits in social-emotional reciprocity” (e.g. difficulty carrying on  
conversation, reciprocating emotional gestures)  
(2) impairments in nonverbal communication (e.g. poor eye contact, trouble  
reading body language) 
(3) “deficits in developing, maintaining, and understanding relationships” (APA, 2013) 
Individuals must also demonstrate two or more restrictive repetitive symptoms:  
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(1) “stereotyped or repetitive motor movements, use of objects, or speech”  
(e.g. hand flapping, lining up toy cars, repeating meaningless phrases)  
(2) rigid adherence to schedules or routines  
(3) restricted interests (e.g. fascinated by wheels rather than cars) 
(4) “hyper- or hyporeactivity to sensory input or unusual interest in sensory  
aspects of the environment” (e.g. strong negative reaction to certain sounds,  
insensitivity to pain) (APA, 2013)  
The DSM describes three different severity levels of autism spectrum disorders ranging 
from Level 3 “Requiring very substantial support” to Level 1 “Requiring support” (APA, 2013). 
Functioning at each level will look a different at each age. The levels are broad enough to cover 
a variety of functioning but we can still get a general idea. Individuals in Level 3 may require 
full time care. They may be completely nonverbal and/or learn to use a symbol chart to 
communicate with a treatment provider. They will likely exhibit several repetitive motor 
behaviors (e.g. hand flapping, making sounds) and exhibit extreme distress when asked to 
change the present course of action. It is often more helpful to refer to individuals with Level 3 
ASD as having severe ASD. Individuals at Level 1, on the other hand, do not require full time 
care to perform age-appropriate basic functions but may need more guidance than their peers. 
They speak clearly but will struggle with social interactions. Fortunately, these individual can 
learn skills to integrate themselves more fully into their social environment. They are inflexible 
in multiple areas and have a hard time changing tasks. This essay focuses primarily on 
individuals in Level 1, “Requiring support.” Members of this population are considered to have 
high-functioning autism spectrum disorder (HFASD) and I will use this designation through the 
essay. 
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From the symptom descriptions and examples, it is clear that ASD is typically diagnosed 
in childhood. Unlike some conditions diagnosed in childhood, ASD is a lifelong disorder than 
persists into adulthood (APA, 2013). While individuals often learn strategies to manage their 
symptoms, there is no cure for ASD. For the purpose of discussing morality and ASD I will 
focus on adults, though some of the research I will cite involves children and young adults. 
As the long and complex list of symptoms suggests, ASD presents disparately in different 
individuals. Historically ASD was divided into three different conditions: autism, Asperger’s 
syndrome, and pervasive developmental disorder not otherwise specified (PDD-NOS) (Ozonoff, 
South, & Miller, 2000). Autism and Asperger’s syndrome were differentiated by differences in 
cognitive functioning and levels of support. Individuals with Asperger’s syndrome required less 
support and performed better on cognitive tasks than individuals with autism. The variability 
within the autism group, however, was still significant with individuals requiring some support 
(e.g. communicating verbally, attending school with assistance, feeding themselves) to 
individuals who require significant support (e.g. no verbal communication, one-on-one 
specialized instruction in an autism-specific school, needs feeding assistance). Individuals with 
PDD-NOS did not meet previous DSM criteria for autism or Asperger’s syndrome but 
demonstrated difficulties in cognitive, social, emotional, and/or behavioral functioning. Some 
individuals presented all symptoms but were excluded for historical reasons. If the parent does 
not remember the child experiencing difficulties before age three or the child is adopted, spent 
time in foster care, was diagnosed as an adult without access to this information, or simply 
developed symptoms later in childhood they may not have been able to satisfy the requirement 
that the child must have presented with “difficulties in at least one domain…prior to age 3” 
(Ozonoff, South, & Miller, 2000, p. 32). Most often, however, individuals with PDD-NOS were 
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just shy of meeting the required number of symptoms needed for diagnosis and were typically 
high-functioning, though not always specifically in the cognitive domain like those with 
Asperger’s syndrome. Unlike Asperger’s syndrome, PDD-NOS was not meant to be a coherent 
diagnosis with similar presentations but rather a catchall category for those who did not meet 
criteria for autism or Asperger’s syndrome but would still benefit from social and educational 
services. 
By collapsing all three conditions we may have sacrificed the coherence of Asperger’s 
syndrome in order to rid ourselves of the arbitrary distinction between PDD-NOS and autism.43 
The justification behind uniting these conditions into a spectrum has been debated and discussed 
elsewhere so I will not debate this decision here (see Moran, 2013 for discussion). If autism 
covered a broad range of presentations before the merger, then adding two conditions will only 
increase how the symptoms manifest. 
To make this condition more concrete (and more human), we can look at case studies at 
multiple stages of ASD. Starting with Level 3, “requiring very substantial support,” we can look 
at Ashley as described by Cathy Lord (2014), one of the leading researchers in the field. Ashley 
was an adolescent with ASD, intellectual disability, and Kleefstra syndrome, a genetic disorder 
that contributed to her intellectual impairment. She attended a special school where she could 
read at roughly a second grade level with little or no understanding. She communicated verbally 
through curt, short sentences and could recognize words but often ignored others and did not 
spontaneously engage in joint attention. She loved license plates – she would draw detailed 
                                                
43 I do not mourn the lost of Asperger’s syndrome but we cannot deny its construct validity. See Frith (1991) for a 
discussion and historical analysis. Lord (2014), on the other hand, argues that we should take instances of familial 
autism and ASD as evidence that the conditions are related and should share the same diagnoses. Individuals 
diagnosed with ASD may have siblings diagnosed with autism or PDD-NOS. 
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images of license plates of various states from memory. She was also attached to her family but 
did not express much interest in other adolescents. 
As Lord (2014) rightfully notes, Ashley’s intellectual impairments and genetic condition 
raise questions about the validity of her diagnosis. If Ashley suffered from intellectual disability 
without ASD we would expect her to have a wide range of interests – coloring, stuffed animals, 
toy cars, etc. – rather than an intense interest in license plates and little else. Furthermore, we 
would not see the same kinds of social impairments. Ashley may have difficulties 
communicating or engaging in the same kinds of activities as her peers but she would be 
interested in her peers and be capable of joint attention. 
It is also instructive to discuss a case at the other end of the spectrum. Individuals like 
Daniel with HFASD live very different lives than individuals like Ashley, despite being 
diagnosed with the same condition. Margaret Dewey (1991) describes a conversation with Anne 
who is an example of someone with Level 1 ASD: “requiring support.” Anne lives on her own in 
an apartment, holds a master’s degree, and enjoys reading and writing in her spare time. Despite 
what she has accomplished, Anne worries that society will reject her: 
I think I am capable of doing good work and of being a loving wife. But I may  
never be able to participate fully in society. I may never be able to find  
somebody or be able to have a full-time job and support myself. There may  
be just this barrier and society will not let me. (quoted in Dewey, 1991, p.  
202, emphasis original) 
 
Anne recognizes that she becomes fixated on certain subjects, talking about a particular 
topic after her audience has lost interest (recall Daniel’s LEGO reenactments). She has also 
developed obsessive anxious thoughts (did I leave the stove on?) and compulsive checking 
behaviors (getting out of bed to check the stove). She is very involved in her church and 
volunteers in politics but wishes she had more friends.  
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While Ashley and other individuals with Level 3 ASD experience deficits in cognitive, 
emotional, behavioral, and social functioning, individuals with Level 1 ASD like Anne and 
Daniel experience primarily social deficits. Anne experiences some behavioral deficits (e.g. 
checking the stove) but these are not the kinds of things that interfere with moral functioning. In 
the next section I will evaluate whether or not the social deficits experienced by individuals with 
HFASD are enough to excuse or exempt them from moral functioning. 
5.3 Evaluating Empathy in ASD 
Few authors are willing to take a definitive stance on the moral status of individuals with 
ASD. De Vignemont and Frith (2008) and Roskies (2011) conclude that the research on ASD 
(even high-functioning) is too tenuous to draw any conclusions about moral functioning. Kahn 
and Fenton (2009) and Jaarsma (2013) conclude that individuals with HFASD should not be held 
morally responsible for their behaviors due to emotional deficits – specifically, deficits in 
empathy.44 None of the authors cite social deficits as a driving force for moral exemption but all 
acknowledge that impairments in social functioning can interfere in morality. 
As I mentioned in the previous section, I will focus primarily on adults with high-
functioning ASD (HFA). I do want to take a moment to discuss the moral status of individuals 
with severe ASD (Level 3). Recall from the description above, individuals with severe ASD have 
deficits in the most basic areas of functioning. Many of these individuals also suffer from 
intellectual deficits (APA, 2013). On most accounts of moral responsibility individuals with 
severe autism are exempt due to global deficits in basic functioning.45 I take this claim to be non-
controversial and will not discuss it further. 
                                                
44 I disagree with their understanding of empathy but their contribution is still relevant to our discussion. 
45 See Stout (2016) for a discussion. 
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 Individuals with HFASD present a more complicated ethical case. On the one hand, they 
do not suffer the profound functional deficits that plague those with severe autism. On the other 
hand, the social deficits exhibited by these individuals may mitigate some of their moral 
responsibility. Additionally, authors like Kahn and Fenton (2009) and Jaarsma (2013) argue that 
individuals with HFASD experience deficits in empathy and conclude that these emotional 
deficits thus exempt them from moral responsibility. By carefully analyzing the empirical 
literature I intend to distinguish between social deficits and empathic functioning. The apparent 
deficits in emotional functioning in individuals with HFASD are better explained by deficits in 
social functioning that can limit epistemic access to morally relevant information.  
 5.3.1 Criteria for Obtaining Good ASD and Empathy Data 
Before we dive into research on ASD and empathy we must first establish some 
constraints on the kinds of studies we are examining. The psychology and neuroscience literature 
is full of contradicting studies on ASD and empathy and we must use a reasonable heuristic to 
identify the most reliable sources. Rueda, Fernández-Berrocal, and Schonert-Reichl (2014) argue 
for two criteria in particular: a homogenous ASD sample and the use of performance-based 
measures to assess empathy deficits. I will discuss each of these constraints in turn. 
 As I discussed in the previous section, ASD has many heterogeneous presentations. 
Recall that previous versions of the DSM distinguished individuals with Asperger’s syndrome 
from autism more broadly for many reasons, but for the purposes of psychological testing it is 
important to note that language was a major divide been Asperger’s and autism more generally. 
Many studies of empathy in ASD still use this terminology to specify which portion of the 
population they are studying. Asperger syndrome may allow for a convenient distinction 
between HFASD and the rest of the spectrum but it is not a precise instrument.  
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To be more precise, research on empathy in ASD should involve participants who qualify 
for the Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS) Module 4. The ADOS assesses the 
patient or participant directly through structured interactions with the experimenter and comes in 
four different modules, numbered 1 through 4 (Lord et al., 2000). ADOS Module 1 is designed to 
test nonverbal young children and Modules 2-4 increase in complexity, evaluating ASD in higher 
mental ages and levels of verbal ability. Module 4 is designed to evaluate ASD in high-
functioning older children and adults (Level 1). Similar to Modules 2 and 3, participants may be 
asked to construct a scene using figurines (optional) or retell a story using a picture book 
(required). While the earlier modules (1 and 2) involve the experimenter observing while the 
participant completes a task, the later modules (3 and 4) involve more conversations between the 
experimenter and the participant.  
According to the authors, Module 4 is designed to evaluate “verbally fluent adults and 
adolescents who are not interested in playing with toys such as action figures (usually over 12-16 
years)” (Lord et al., 2000, p. 207). This excludes younger children who might be evaluated for 
ASD using Modules 1-3 and non-verbal adolescents and adults. Module 4 involves conversations 
about daily living as well as social interactions (Bastiaansen et al., 2011). For example, the 
interviewer asks the participant about her experience with bullying in school and if other students 
were bullied. This gives participants an opportunity to discuss their understanding of the feelings 
of others (Lord et al., 2012). In another section, the participant is asked to describe her feelings 
of happiness, fear, anxiety/concern, anger, sadness, and relaxation/contentment. Module 4 also 
includes a scoring coding section “Comments on Others’ Emotions/Empathy” to be evaluated 
during conversational and narrative tasks (Lord et al., 2012, p. 17). 
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Unfortunately, none of the studies on ASD and empathy use the criteria outlined above.46 
Most of the studies I discuss below use DSM-IV-TR criteria for Asperger syndrome which helps 
narrow down the sample. While this distinction is not as modern or precise as the ADOS Module 
4, it does include most of the individuals we are interested in studying. Future studies of empathy 
in ASD should use Module 4 eligibility.  
 The second criterion proposes that researchers use performance-based measures of 
empathy rather than self-report. Self-report measures are often biased in favor of the participant. 
Items such as “When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to put myself in his shoes for a while,” 
ask the participant to evaluate her own empathic abilities and have a clear, socially desirable 
response (Davis, 1980). Self-assessment runs the risk of being inaccurate; after all, an individual 
might think of herself as someone who can readily put herself in a character’s shoes when she 
actually struggles with perspective-taking tasks. 
 It may turn out that neither a homogenous sample or performance-based tasks are 
stringent enough. Perhaps a new measure of empathy in HFASD will prove more accurate than 
our current performance-based measures. It may be the case that only certain performance 
measures give us an accurate approximation of empathy in ASD.47  
 5.3.2 Data on HFASD and Empathy 
Using these criteria I identified several studies that measure empathic capacities in 
individuals with HFASD. Rueda, Fernández-Berrocal, and Baron-Cohen (2015) measured 
empathy using Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, Davis, 1983) and the performance-based 
Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). The IRI is a self-report, Likert-scale consisting of two 
subscales, perspective taking (PT) and empathic concern (EC). The Eyes Test is a performance-
                                                
46 Studies available at time of publication and using relevant search criteria. 
47 I am grateful for personal correspondence with Susan Fitzpatrick who pointed out this issue. 
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based measure that evaluates the participant’s ability to recognize the mental states of another 
agent from a photo of the agent’s eyes and eyebrows (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). In both the self-
report perspective-taking subscale of the IRI and the Eyes Test, the authors found statistically 
significant deficits in participants with Asperger syndrome compared to age-, sex-, and IQ-
matched controls (Rueda, Fernández-Berrocal,  & Baron-Cohen, 2015). At first glance it appears 
that individuals with HFASD demonstrated deficits in empathic functioning in this study. If we 
look more carefully we see that both the perspective-taking subscale and the Eyes Test measure 
social rather than emotional capacities. The authors describe their results in terms of social 
consequences: “during adolescence youth with AS usually become ‘target’ of bullies…and do 
not distinguish between ‘friendly jokes’ and aggression or offenses” (p. 92). This suggests that 
the difference in descriptions is best explained by social factors. 
Furthermore, individuals with Asperger syndrome did not perform significantly different 
on the empathic concern subscale of the IRI. The empathic concern subscale contains items like 
“I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me” (Davis, 1983, p. 117). 
Though it is a self-report measure (like the perspective-taking subscale), the empathic concern 
seems to track the emotional capacities involved in moral functioning.  
Using similar methodology, Senland and Higgins-D’Alessandro (2013) compared 
empathy, social competency, and moral reasoning in adolescents with HFASD (the DSM-5 
definition, spanning the older notions of autism, PDD-NOS, and Asperger syndrome) and age-
matched controls. The authors also used the IRI as a self-report measure of empathy but 
employed the qualitative “difficult real life situations interview” (Wainryb, Brehl, and Matwin, 
2005) as a performance- based measure. In this paradigm experimenters ask participants to do 
the following:  
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(1) discuss an instance where they encountered a difficult situation but did not know 
how to handle it,  
(2) describe their response and why they made this choice 
(3) discuss their strengths in these kinds of situations 
(4) assess their ability to perform “prosocial moral behaviors including helping 
others, following rules, keeping promises, and being nice” 
(5) describe how they came to be self-aware of their own abilities. 
To assess moral reasoning the authors used the sociomoral reflection measure (Gibbs, Basinger, 
& Fuller, 1992). This measure evaluates a participant’s moral values and reasons for endorsing 
these values. Questions include: “…how important is it for people to tell the truth?” (Gibbs, 
Basinger, & Fuller, 1992, p. 151) and “…how important is it for people to keep promises, if they 
can, to friends?” (p. 150).  
 The authors found that adolescents with HFASD performed more poorly on the moral 
reasoning tasks than controls. Consistent with Rueda, Fernández-Berrocal, and Baron-Cohen 
(2015), they found no significant differences in the empathic concern subscale of the IRI. The 
qualitative analysis is more convoluted. While both HFASD adolescents and the control group 
emphasized the importance of empathic concerns in difficult situations, individuals in the control 
group gave more examples of helping others in response to (1) above. One explanation for this 
discrepancy is that teens with HFASD tend to be bullied more often than other adolescents. We 
can see this see evidence for this in the examples provided by the participants: “We won the 
game…[A girl who lost comes over with a stake and hit me with it. The counselor broke it up…” 
(Senland & Higgins-D’Alessandro, 2013, p. 217). This study suggests that individuals with 
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HFASD experience social deficits that are related to, but not indicative of, their empathic 
abilities. 
Schwenck and colleagues (2012) conducted a different performance-based task with boys 
with ASD, boys with conduct disorder (a condition associated with severe behavioral 
dysfunction), and age and IQ matched control group of boys with no diagnosed mental illnesses 
(IQ average of 105.7 for control group compared to 102.6 for ASD group and 101.8 for conduct 
disorder group, p. 653). The experimenters showed participants nine short film clips (14-48 
seconds) of emotional situations and are asked to identify the emotions experienced by one or 
two protagonists. Participants were asked “to take the perspective of the protagonist and to 
explain why he had felt as he did” (Schwenck et al,, 2012, p. 654). Participants were also asked 
how they felt after each clip.  
The authors found that ASD group performed more poorly than the conduct disorder and 
control groups on the first task. They found it more difficult to identify the emotions 
demonstrated in the video clip. When asked how they felt after viewing the clip, however, the 
ASD group performed comparably with the control group, while the boys with conduct disorder 
did not feel as emotionally moved by the clips. You might think of this result as similar to 
watching an emotionally gripping movie with a large group of people. As long as the movie is 
done well, nearly everyone in the theater will feel moved by the protagonist’s plight. Afterwards 
you may even discuss how the protagonist felt joy at meeting the love of his life or sorrow when 
his mother passed away. This study suggests that individuals with ASD (high functioning, based 
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on the IQ scores and type of testing) may struggle to put words to the types of emotions 
experienced by another person but that they nevertheless feel with another.48 
The three studies I described above are not the only evidence on the subject of HFASD 
and empathy but, as I mentioned in my analysis of the kinds of research in this field, they are 
some of the best. Moreover, current treatment practices operate on the assumption that 
individuals with HFASD are capable of empathy. Children diagnosed with HFASD can be 
enrolled in social skills groups to improve their peer interactions. Children with severe conduct 
disorder, for instance, are not enrolled in these groups. Children like Daniel want to learn how to 
interact with others and translate empathic concern into successful social action, whereas 
children with severe conduct disorder (specifically, conduct disorder with empathy deficits) lack 
genuine empathic concern and would desire social prowess only for manipulating others. 
The research above clearly indicates that individuals with HFASD experience difficulties 
in social functioning. The extent of these challenges can vary by age, experience with therapy 
program, and other factors but social impairment is a key feature in the diagnosis of HFASD. As 
we saw above, social impairment often interferes with an individual’s empathic capacities. Even 
if individuals with HFASD are fully capable of empathy the social challenges may excuse or 
exempt them from moral responsibility. 
5.4 Empathy, Epistemic Impairment, and Moral Functioning 
Before we evaluate how social impairments can affect moral functioning, I think it helps 
to take a step back and briefly discuss what makes empathy moral. Empathy motivates moral 
actions when we recognize the suffering of another and feel a desire to help (c.f Cameron and 
Rapier, 2017). Individuals with HFASD can recognize the suffering of another, feel a desire to 
                                                
48 I acknowledge that this study was conducted with only males and with adolescents. These limitations constrain 
the results but also suggest that empathy is a capacity present even in children with HFASD. 
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help, and act morally. Like any of us, an individual with HFASD may recognize the suffering of 
another, feel a desire to help, but feel uncertain about the appropriate moral action. For example: 
I recognize that my friend is struggling to find employment. I want to help her but I have no 
connections in her field or her city. I can provide emotional support but her intense anxiety 
suggests she needs more. It is unclear what morality demands of me in this situation. My 
epistemic resources are limited (I am not knowledgeable about her field or location) and 
moreover, it does not seem like morality would require that I research jobs on her behalf. It 
seems that I am doing the best I can; I am acting morally. 
Similarly, we can think of someone with HFASD who lacks certain epistemic resources 
that prevent them from discerning the morally appropriate action. Amari is a young adult with 
HFASD. Amari sees that his friend Malik is crying at his father’s funeral (recognizes suffering) 
and wants to help ease his suffering (desire to help) but he does not know the conventions for 
comforting people who experience these kinds of loses. Amari has comforted Malik friend after 
several bad break ups and failed exams. During those times the young men would order a pizza, 
play video games, and talk about how Malik was better off single or how he would ace the next 
exam. The loss of Malik’s father feels qualitatively different. Amari does not know how people 
comfort others after such a loss and none of his past experiences gives him any guidance on how 
to proceed. Amari decides that he ought to do something rather than nothing so he sticks with the 
social script he knows best. At the wake, Amari asks Malik if he wants to come over for pizza 
and video games later that night. Malik declines, saying he needs to be with his family for the 
time being. 
Just as we would not hold me morally blameworthy for failing to know how to help my 
friend, we should not hold Amari morally blameworthy for not knowing how to comfort Malik. 
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(This is not a comment on mine or Amari’s agency or our level of moral responsibility at the 
time: if either of us were to run a red light or steal from our elderly neighbor that same day we 
would be blameworthy for either of those actions.) It also does not speak to our typical 
responsibility as friends. If my friend asked me to read a cover letter and I have plenty of time on 
my hands, I would be blameworthy for blowing her off. Similarly, if Malik asks Amari to feed 
his dog while he’s busy with funeral activities, Amari would be blameworthy for neglecting this 
task. Moreover, Amari is not temporarily deficient in any of his moral capacities nor does he 
escape responsibility due to the circumstances. Under these conditions the individual with 
deficient capacities typically fails to recognize the moral salience of the situation. Nor is he like 
the individual who recognizes the moral salience but is not motivated to act through malice, 
laziness, or motivational incapacitation. Finally, Amari is not like the individual who recognizes 
the moral salience, is motivated to act, and does not perform the moral action due to 
incapacitation. He is fully capable of performing the moral action but may not know what the 
action is. 
This vignette is consistent with the research discussed in Section 3. Recall that across all 
studies HFASD participants performed just as well as the control groups in measures of empathic 
concern. We can understand this as Amari’s ability to recognize Malik’s suffering and feel 
compelled to help. Group differentiation occurred in the evaluative tasks when participants were 
asked to “take the perspective of the protagonist and to explain why he had felt as he did” 
(Schwenck et al,, 2012, p. 654), approximating the kind of social guesswork involved in figuring 
out how to comfort someone in a novel situation.  
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 5.4.1 Epistemic Exemption? 
Up to this point I have argued individuals with HFASD are morally responsible for their 
actions because they are capable of experiencing empathy. Even if you are on board with the 
discussion thus far you may still have concerns about the epistemic impairments. If we 
understand the social difficulties experienced by individuals with ASD as epistemic impairments 
that can interfere with moral functioning, it seems that we have just pushed the problem into a 
new category and that epistemic impairments may still excuse or exempt individuals with 
HFASD from moral responsibility. Recall from the example of me and my friend, any moral 
agent can encounter epistemic difficulties in a moral situation. Furthermore, it seems that agents 
who have not cultivated their moral abilities will be more likely to encounter epistemic 
difficulties in moral situations. 
In a study of nurses discussing workplace challenges, many participants described 
instances where they felt distress at the plight of their patients, were motivated to help, but felt 
unsure of what actions to take (Varcoe et al., 2012). One nurse described an instance where 
failures in hospital hierarchy left them caring for a critically ill patient (without guidance from a 
doctor): “…it was terrible caring for someone, feeling I was way out of my scope of 
practice…we felt helpless” (Varcoe et al., 2012, p. 492). Similarly, O’Donnell and colleagues 
(2008) found that social workers who encountered ethical stress (including situations where the 
morally right action was controversial or unclear) performed fewer moral actions.   
Some cases of epistemic difficulties seem unavoidable. No matter how much training and 
preparation nurses undertake, they can still experience the consequences of incompetent 
superiors. A social worker with years of experience can still encounter a novel moral dilemma. 
We can, on the other hand, prepare for many moral situations by cultivating our moral faculties. 
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If we ascribe to an Aristotelian virtue theory of morality, for instance, we can do generous 
actions in order to become more charitable, brave actions to become more courageous, kind 
actions to become compassionate, and so on. If an individual without HFASD who has not 
cultivated her moral faculties encounters a novel moral situation she will likely have difficulty 
determining what to do. This does not, however, excuse or exempt her from moral responsibility; 
it merely makes her less virtuous or praiseworthy than the individual who has cultivated her 
moral faculties, knows what behavior is morally required, and behaves morally. 
For an individual with HFASD, cultivating one’s moral faculties involves the same moral 
cultivation as any other agent plus development of social faculties. As I alluded to in earlier 
sections, individuals with HFASD can participate in social skills groups and individual therapy 
to learn strategies for navigating social interactions. Jaarsma (2013) emphasizes the importance 
of learning moral rules, especially for children with HFASD. Social skills groups focus on 
interacting with peers, adults (in the case of children) and authority figures (as needed). In a 
meta-analysis of studies on the effectiveness of social skills groups, Reichow and Volkmar 
(2010) found that most participants did see a measurable improvement in social skills after 
attending a group. Methodology can vary from group to group and the authors acknowledged the 
need for additional evaluation of how different methodologies may be more effective for 
different individuals. For our purposes it is clear that social skills, like moral skills, can be 
improved. 
 5.4.2 Unequal Footing 
The social difficulties experienced by individuals with HFASD may not be 
insurmountable but we might worry that starting with this kind of deficit puts the individual with 
HFASD at a disadvantage in discerning morally appropriate responses. Even if you are willing to 
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grant that individuals with HFASD are fully capable of empathy and that the social impairments 
do not excuse or exempt them from moral responsibility, you might still think that they are less 
responsible (in terms of degree) than an agent without compromised social faculties. On this 
view, the individual with HFASD would increase their degree of moral responsibility as they 
continue to develop social skills.49 
In reply I return to the example of my friend who is searching for a job. It is possible that 
if I had better employment connections that I would know how to help my friend in this 
situation. My lack of connections, however, does not diminish my moral responsibility. I am at 
best praiseworthy for doing everything in my power to help and comfort her and at worst morally 
neutral. Moral neutrality in this situation, however, does not change my capacity for moral 
responsibility in general. Similarly, we ought to understand individuals with HFASD as morally 
neutral or praiseworthy in situations where they do not have epistemic access to the morally 
appropriate action. These situations do not have bearing on their capacity for moral behavior or 
moral responsibility in general. 
We might also consider Vargas’s (2013) situational view of moral responsibility. Vargas 
argues that individuals have a capacity for detecting moral considerations and a capacity for self-
control. He claims that these capacities can be exercised or fail to be exercised depending on the 
context. Even if we apply this situational approach, individuals with HFASD are morally 
responsible because they consistently exercise their capacity for detecting moral considerations. 
5.5 Conclusion 
It has always been one of the worst traumas for me to feel I have displeased somebody. I 
tend to remember it years afterwards. It hurts more than I can bear, practically. One 
                                                
49 Even if social difficulties do not affect an individual with HFASD’s moral functioning, we might think that these 
challenges affect the pursuit of virtue. See my discussion of moral superheroes in the previous chapter. 
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thing I do is daydream about how I can be reconciled with people I have displeased and 
change their opinion of me (Jack Dewey quoted in Dewey, 1991). 
 
 The empirical evidence is clear and the people who work with individuals with HFASD 
will also attest: individuals with HFASD feel empathy deeply and are motivated to help others.50 
It is important not to understate the social challenges experienced by this population but it is 
equally important to acknowledge that these challenges are treatable through therapy and social 
skills groups. Individuals with HFASD experience an epistemic deficit: they recognize the moral 
salience of a situation, are motivated to act morally, but may not always know how to implement 
the proper moral action. Epistemic deficits can interfere with any agent’s pursuit of moral action 
– from nurses to social workers. We all struggle to discern what morality requires of us yet we 
are still morally responsible for our actions.  
 
                                                
50 I acknowledge that there can be morally bad people who have HFASD. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion – Lessons in Moral Pathology 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The title “Moral Pathology” is slightly misleading. On the one hand, I discussed several 
instances where mental illness caused moral dysfunction. At least one presentation of all four 
conditions resulted in moral dysfunction. On the other hand, I also discussed how the study of 
morality and mental illness expands what it means to be moral and virtuous. I identified 
additional capacities required for functioning and argued that we should be pluralists about the 
pursuit of virtue. Mental illness revealed that our understandings of morality and virtue are 
dysfunctional. In other words, moral pathology represents two sides of the same coin: 
pathological moral behavior and pathological misunderstandings of moral behavioral. 
In this dissertation I discussed four conditions: psychopathy, addiction, borderline 
personality disorder (BPD), and autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Along the way I garnered 
insights about moral responsibility, virtue, and methods for studying morality and mental illness. 
In this chapter I will summarize these insights by topic rather than condition, beginning with the 
capacities required for moral responsibility. I will then discuss insights into virtue followed by 
lessons in methodology.  
6.2 Capacities Required for Moral Responsibility 
I never intended to establish a unique account of moral responsibility. Throughout this 
dissertation I built upon Vargas’s (2013) notion of moral responsibility. His account claims that 
an individual is morally responsible if she has the capacity for detecting moral considerations, 
the capacity to provide reasons for her actions, and a capacity for self-control. I also discussed 
Fischer and Ravizza’s (1998) theory of excusing and exempting conditions. While Fischer and 
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Ravizza’s account offers examples like ignorance and incapacitation (excusing conditions), they 
do not set out an exhaustive list of things that excuse or exempt individuals from moral 
responsibility. I combined these approaches and identified two new capacities required for moral 
responsibility: compassion and emotion regulation. Impairment in either of these capacities can 
result in excusing or exempting conditions, depending on the extent and nature of the 
dysfunction. 
 6.2.1 Compassion 
Compassion can be understood as a particular kind of reasons-responsiveness. To be 
capable of compassion in the morally-relevant sense is to be properly responsive to compassion-
relevant cues in the environment. An individual recognizes another person is suffering 
(compassion-relevant cue), feels a desire to help (often accompanied by emotional distress), and 
performs a moral action. Psychopaths are compassion deficient because they do not experience 
distress and are not motivated to help when exposed to compassion-relevant cues (i.e. another 
person suffering). Socially adept psychopaths often perform a seemingly moral action when 
confronted with compassion-relevant cues. This should not be mistaken for the capacity to 
experience compassion; such individuals have merely learned these socially desirable behaviors 
in order advance their own ends.  
 Individuals with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder (HFASD), on the other hand, 
are capable of compassion but experience difficulties implementing moral action. Individuals 
with HFASD recognize compassion-relevant cues, feel compelled to act, but may not know what 
action to take. Individuals with HFASD experience deficits in social functioning that make it 
more difficult to implement compassionate in interpersonal scenarios. The contrast of these two 
populations demonstrates the importance of this capacity. 
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Schwenck and colleagues (2012) studied compassion in boys with developmental 
disorders. They compared boys with conduct disorder with callous and unemotional traits (boys 
with the prerequisites for psychopathy) and boys with ASD. Their results prove relevant to our 
discussion. They found that boys with callous and unemotional traits felt significantly less 
compassion than boys with ASD when watching emotional videos. As I demonstrated in 
Chapters 2 and 4, robust research in psychopathy and ASD supports the assertion that 
compassion is a capacity required for moral responsibility. 
 6.2.2 Emotion Regulation 
Unlike compassion, there is nothing specifically moral about emotion regulation. 
Emotion dysregulation impacts our relationships, cognition, physical and mental health as well 
as other areas of our lives. The importance of emotion regulation may span many capacities but 
it no less essential to moral functioning. Similarly, Vargas’s capacity for self-control spans 
multiple non-moral domains of our lives, including our relationships, health, and goal-
directedness, but is nonetheless essential for moral responsibility. I discussed emotion regulation 
in Chapters 3 and 4 in the context of addiction and borderline personality disorder (BPD), 
respectively. Specific discussion of emotion regulation and moral responsibility took place in 
Chapter 3 but support for this argument was implicit in the BPD symptoms discussion in Chapter 
4.  
 In Chapter 3 I proposed a theory of addiction and emotion regulation. I argued that 
individuals with substance use disorders were exempt from moral responsibility due to deficits in 
emotion regulation. Individuals with addiction use substances to help regulate their emotions; 
they compensate for deficiencies in emotion regulation through their drug(s) of choice. This 
theory is supported by data on successful rehabilitation strategies and studies like Robins, Davis, 
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and Goodwin’s (1974) work on heroin use in Vietnam. The authors found that 20% of men who 
had not used heroin prior to enlisting reported becoming addicted to heroin while in Vietnam. 
The emotion regulation theory explains this rise by citing highly stressful circumstances.51 While 
these men were able to regulate their emotions while living in the United States and encountering 
fairly unremarkable obstacles, they suddenly found themselves surrounded by a treacherous hell-
scape when dropped in Vietnam. The sights and sounds of death and destruction outstripped their 
capacities for emotion regulation and one-fifth turned to narcotics.52 If this explanation is correct 
then we would expect that nearly all of the men became sober soon after returning home. Robins, 
Davis, and Goodwin (1974) found that less than 1% of men reported being addicted to heroin 
within a year of leaving Vietnam.  
 We also see emotion regulation as a capacity required for moral functioning in 
individuals with BPD. Chapter 4 focuses mostly on individuals who are in recovery from BPD. 
Individuals who meet clinical criteria for BPD, though they struggle with emotion regulation, do 
regulate their emotions and are morally responsible for their behavior. Symptoms of BPD 
include difficulties regulating anger, strong fear of abandonment, mood instability, and a 
tendency to provoke volatile relationships (APA, 2013). These symptoms all relate to difficulties 
in regulating one’s emotions and can interfere with moral behavior. 
 6.2.3 Other Observations 
Throughout the dissertation I made note of several other capacities related to mental 
illness that are also required for moral functioning but have been discussed at length by other 
authors. Psychopathy, addiction, BPD, and ASD all can all cause some degree of cognitive 
impairment. Some psychopaths are exempt from moral responsibility based on cognitive 
                                                
51 I do not deny the role of access. If cocaine had been readily available instead then the men would have become 
addicted to cocaine instead. 
52 This does not include the men that started smoking cigarettes or the rates of alcoholism. 
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impairment alone. The autism spectrum is characterized by all levels of cognitive functioning. I 
focused on individuals with average or above average cognitive functioning but acknowledged 
that many individuals with ASD would be exempt from moral responsibility due to cognitive 
impairments.53 In rare cases addiction can cause severe cognitive impairments which can then 
mitigate moral responsibility. I acknowledged that symptoms of BPD can interfere with 
cognitive functioning and this is but one piece of the moral puzzle in this population. 
6.3  Lessons in Virtue Ethics 
In Chapter 5 I concluded that certain notions of virtue ethics make the pursuit of virtue 
impossible for individuals who have recovered from BPD. On these views of virtue, individuals 
who have recovered from BPD are considered merely continent and continence is incompatible 
with virtue. I suggested that virtue ethics ought to be more inclusive and proposed a pluralist 
account. On this view, individuals who have recovered from BPD are moral superheroes who are 
capable of pursuing virtue.  
 Individuals who recover from BPD are moral superheroes because they overcome 
residual symptoms of BPD to act morally. The designation of “moral superhero” is not reserved 
only for individuals who recover from BPD. The individual with HFASD who attends social 
skills groups so they can better understand the nuances of others’ needs and the addict in 
remission who chooses to attend therapy and emotion regulation classes can both be moral 
superheroes. Despite their ongoing battles, I expect many individuals with mental illness are 
moral superheroes who are capable of pursuing virtue. 
 The pluralist account has implications beyond mental illness and moral superheroes. I 
argued that continence can be virtuous if an individual is struggling to do a virtuous action for 
                                                
53 It is important to note that sorting out responsibility based on cognitive functioning in the case of ASD is more 
complex than with psychopathy. 
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non-vicious reasons. This applies to individuals who have recovered from BPD because residual 
symptoms are non-vicious. This could also apply to someone who feels the pull of other, non-
vicious inclinations that are not related to mental illness. We can think of a parent who is 
preparing to attend their child’s graduation when suddenly their other child becomes violently ill. 
The parent rushes the sick child to the hospital and is forced to miss the graduation ceremony. 
The parent acts morally by tending to the sick child but we would be surprised if they did not 
feel any sorrow about missing their other child’s graduation. The parent does not regret their 
decision but feels the weight of having missed an important occasion in their child’s life.  
 The pluralist account makes sense of this inner turmoil: the parent’s non-virtuous 
inclinations are non-vicious (born out of their concern for their other child) and therefore do not 
detract from the virtuous nature of their moral actions. Other accounts of virtue (e.g. McDowell’s 
(1978) silencing view) would argue that the parent’s actions are merely continent since she 
experiences inclinations to do otherwise. The pluralist account, born out of a careful analysis of 
borderline personality disorder, allows us to side with our intuitions in cases of non-vicious 
internal conflict and allow more diversity in the pursuit of virtue. 
6.4 Fruitful Methodology 
Perhaps the most valuable lesson to draw from this research is that studying ethics 
through mental illness is a fruitful endeavor. As I expected, we can learn a great deal about what 
it means to be a moral agent and how we should understand the pursuit of virtue by looking to 
the margins. Clinicians and philosophers alike shy away from BPD. By breaking down the 
symptoms and severity and discussing real-life cases in the literature and with practitioners, I 
was able to break through the stigma to reveal moral superheroes. While I was not the first 
philosopher to explore psychopathy, addiction, and ASD, I argued that the study of mental 
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illness requires critical analysis of the empirical literature and qualitative engagement with the 
population when available. 
 This approach is founded on the belief that not all studies are created equal and that some 
measures will be more relevant to morality than others. At times this leads to disappointment. In 
Chapter 5 I discussed the ADOS at length only to reveal in the following section that no current 
studies of ASD and morality used this measure. Nonetheless, knowledge of the philosophical 
(and psychological) gold standard helped me identify the kind of performance-based tasks to 
look for ASD research.  
 I believe this approach can and should be replicated when studying morality and any 
mental illness; careful analysis and qualitative engagement (when possible) does not merely 
apply to the four conditions discussed in this dissertation. Someone interested in morality and 
eating disorders, for instance, develop an understanding of how the symptoms manifest at 
different levels of severity, attend support groups (if possible) and/or meet with treatment 
providers, analyze data on successful treatment methodology and relapse rates, and so on. The 
philosopher diving into the literature on mental illness has a responsibility, not only to the 
discipline but also to the population she is discussing, to develop a comprehensive understanding 
of the condition and a critical approach to the empirical literature. 
6.5 Conclusion 
…I find that I frequently feel better about myself when I discover that we’re not alone,  
but that there are, in fact, a number of other people who ail as we do – that there are  
actually a number of “accomplished” individuals who find it necessary to seek treatment  
for some otherwise insurmountable inner unpleasantness. I not only feel better about  
myself because these people are also f**ked up (and I guess this gives us a sense of  
extended community), but I feel better because look how much these fellow f**kups  
managed to accomplish! Carrie Fisher (2008, p. 11) 
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 Fisher accurately describes a stereotype of individuals with mental illness with her choice 
of colorful language. She also acknowledges that many people suffer, seek treatment, and go on 
to do great things. What she doesn’t seem to understand is that the story is often more complex. 
People suffer, seek treatment, and go on to do great things while having bad days and remaining 
in therapy. They are often capable of being morally responsible for their actions. Not only that, 
people with mental illness can be virtuous even if they experience some degree of near 
“insurmountable inner unpleasantness” that they keep at bay after (often years of) therapy, 
support groups, learning to manage their emotions, medication, and so on. Fisher was right. She, 
and others like her are “not alone”; they’re members of the moral community. 
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